

Nuclearisation in Europe and the Middle East – From threat to preventive action

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INTRODUCTION

From March 22nd to 25th 2007 PSR/IPPNW Switzerland organized a symposium with the topic „Growing nuclearisation of the world“. During these 4 days on Monte Verità, above Locarno in the Southern Swiss Canton of Ticino, about 50 participants discussed specifically three issues interrelated to each other:

1. Has the time come to promote Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Europe and the Middle East?
2. Should the control function of the IAEA be strengthened *and*
3. Mutual respect in political negotiations.

In the past, in (not so) diplomatic exchanges, substantial mistakes were made by powerful countries critical of other proud nations with a long history. Those mistakes based on misconceptions, mistrust and lack of respect. On the other hand certain principles which govern the peaceful coexistence of nations have not been respected by local powers. Hatred here and there, posturing and menaces today increase the likelihood for military attacks, not only in the Middle East but also on the Korean Peninsula. As predicted, unfortunately global horizontal proliferation has increased the risk for deployment of nuclear weapons.

As physicians we know: We cannot help in case of a nuclear war. Prevention is the only way.

IPPNW in the past has received the Nobel peace prize for successful mediation between the former Sowjet Union and the Western nations. Nowadays debating the issues of countering nuclear proliferation and of promoting security in a future world without nuclear weapons is needed to advance the ever so necessary peace work in the Middle East.

With speakers experienced in international diplomacy and knowledgeable about the political and security issues in the Middle East and Europe it was hoped that discussions during the symposium again would contribute to a better mutual understanding of the problems. Furthermore we expected that realistic goals of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Europe and the Middle East could be defined and necessary political measures and next steps towards such zones would be talked about. In this context we gave a high priority to open and honest discussions with respect for cultural differences between the participants.

These **Summaries of Presentations** – a supplement to PSRnews 01,02/2007 – reflect the work which has been done before and during the Symposium. Some contributions had to be modified due to lack of space (but full versions are available on www.ippnw.ch). The organisers are deeply thankful to all speakers and hope that these **Summaries** contribute to the preparations for the 2010NPT-Review process.

Dr. med. Günter Baitsch,
Prof. Dr. med. Andreas Nidecker,
Dr. med. Claudio Knüsli



panoramic view from Monte Verità, photo by Claudio Knüsli



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WELCOME: GLOBAL NUCLEARISATION – LINKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH

Dr. Claudio KNÜSLI, President PSR/IPPNW Switzerland

27 000 Nuclear warheads worldwide after NPT

With the perverse invention of the atomic bomb mankind for the first time in history was capable of destroying with one blow hundreds of thousands of human beings – that is populations of whole cities - mainly civilians, women and men of any age as well as children. ***This weapon of mass destruction is illegal, inhuman and immoral.*** Nearly four decades after establishing the Non Proliferation Treaty we still have 27 000 nuclear warheads worldwide – warheads which are far more devastating than the dreadful A-bombs dropped in 1945 over Japan. In Europe and the Middle East four of the established nuclear powers are involved - the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Russia. There are newcomers like Pakistan and India, and there is Israel – as publicly denoted in February this year by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Prevention is the only solution

As doctors we never will be able to help the victims of another nuclear bombing. Every medical system would collapse. With this awareness as doctors we are deeply convinced that only ***prevention*** of a nuclear war is suitable. We remember ***Albert Schweitzer***. He strongly opposed war and especially nuclear war. He set the medical and moral foundation for the abolition of nuclear weapons. He formulated his deep concern about the nuclear threat 50 years ago in his Declaration of Conscience. He strongly advocated for ***Prevention*** during his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech.

Nuclear threat to public health: Siamese Twins

Military and so called peaceful forms of nuclear power are Siamese twins. The interdependence of both industrial and warfare industry is well illustrated by the actual ongoing crisis due to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Also the horrible health damages to life are very similar. Both the casualties of the A-bombings in Japan and the victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 suffered from acute irradiation effects and continue to develop health problems due to manmade radioactive irradiation decades later. The world wide risk of another large scale nuclear accident in a nuclear power plant after 40 years of operational life is higher than 1 in 3, and it is about 1 in 6 in Europe, where we live with 150 nuclear power plants. (Lit 1.) This unacceptable high risk is only one of the many reasons for abandoning nuclear power in the future.

Doomsday Clock Concept - a symbol for the threat of annihilation of mankind

On January 17th 2007, the hands of the Doomsday clock were set from 7 to 5 minutes before midnight taking in account ongoing worldwide nuclearisation and climate change. ***Nuclear Weapon free Zones*** could be a chance to reduce this threat. They represent a non-destructive network of selfrestriction, are bridgeheads of hope and have also been called “The Kings Path to Peace”.

Lit 1. Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke – Phase B (Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit GRS) Köln 6.1989



Claudio Knüsli is a medical oncologist working at the St.Claraspital in Basel, Switzerland.

Having written his MD thesis on cancer evolving due to chronic phenacetin ingestion and being confronted in his everyday work with patients suffering from cancers due to toxic exposure as nicotine or asbestos he got interested in the subject of tumor induction by chronic radioactive low dose irradiation. He was concerned about the fact, that medical literature doesn't provide sufficient information about health risks due to nuclear accidents and especially development of cancer in persons exposed to radiation after the Chernobyl accident. He contributed to the organisation of two Symposia of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland about health consequences both in children and adults after the Chernobyl catastrophe. He was involved with the antinuclear campaign in Switzerland 2003. He is convinced that nuclear power is not a valuable response to climate change because it is too dangerous. He therefore supports projects dealing with decentralised, renewable and sustainable energy production.

He was elected president of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland in 2005.

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HISTORY OF IPPNW AND ITS ROLE IN MEDIATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA DURING THE COLD WAR.

Dr. Gunnar WESTBERG, Co-President, IPPNW, Sweden (Summary by Dr. Claudio Knüsli)

Bernard Lown from Boston and Evgenij Chazov from Moscow, both world reknown cardiologists, founded IPPNW 26 years ago. They were convinced that **“there is a greater threat to human health today than heart disease, and that is nuclear war between our two countries”**. As doctors they were not pushing ideologies, but life. They knew that doctors cannot help after a nuclear war. Prevention is the only way. The bridge of medicine was one reason for the former Soviet president Gorbachev to unilaterally stop all nuclear weapons tests. Today promotion of a dialogue between islamic and christian civilisation could lead to tolerance. And medical bridge-building could include an exchange of medical students between India and Pakistan or between North-Korea and western countries.

IPPNW supports the **concept of change to human security instead of military security**.

What is human security to a woman in a poor village in India? Is she secure because India has nuclear weapons? There is in most countries a competition between the military expense and the expense on health and education. In the USA today the enormous military budget leaves fewer possibilities to support health care for those without private medical insurance. The USA is planning to sell nuclear fuel to India, which will make it possible for India to make 25 instead of five nuclear weapons every year. Pakistan feels the need to keep up. There will be less money for vaccines for children, for primary medical care in the villages, less money for the education of mothers in India and even more so in Pakistan. It is our duty, to remind the politicians that this arms race will kill children, even if the weapons are not used.

Most importantly, **IPPNW should bring to everybody’s knowledge the real meaning of nuclear war**. We know that the US administration has plans for an extensive attack against Iran with the aim is to destroy its nuclear program. Key installations are deeply underground and could only be destroyed with very large nuclear bombs. Their use would cause an enormous amount of nuclear fallout threatening millions of people of the region according to the actual wind direction. Here we must try to get the opinion in the USA and in the world to take action and raise the voice against the US leadership.

As the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped the US can no longer use nuclear weapons as a deterrent. **The nuclear proliferation increases the risk of an attack on the USA or US interests**. This is the opinion of four former US statesmen (George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, Wall Street Journal of Jan 4 2007). All nuclear weapons therefore should be abolished - in a world without nuclear weapons the US would still have an overwhelming unquestioned military superiority.



Gunnar Westberg studied medicine at the Universities of Uppsala and Göteborg, Sweden and graduated in 1964. He specialized in internal medicine and nephrology (kidney diseases). Most of his research was carried out at the University of Minnesota 1967-71 and 1992-93 and dealt with kidney function and immunological studies of kidney diseases. Beside teaching of the art of medicine gradually became more important to him than research. In 2006 he retired from his position as Professor of Medicine at the Sahlgren’s Academy at Göteborg to be able to devote more time to his work as co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, IPPNW.

was founded by doctors from the USA and the Soviet Union in 1980. The purpose was, and remains, to inform about the medical consequences of nuclear war. We believe that if people really understand what a nuclear war would lead to, maybe the destruction of all human civilization, they would demand that all nuclear weapons are abolished. The organisation rapidly grew and established affiliates in 60 countries and gained more than 150,000 members. Today IPPNW works also to prevent all wars, and has an active campaign against small weapons. IPPNW received the Nobel Peace Award in 1985 for its work against nuclear war and for building a bridge between the two sides in the Cold War.



HOW THE AFRICAN CONTINENT BECAME A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

Dr. Ime A. JOHN, Co-President IPPNW, Nigeria / Sweden

Preamble

- Political history of African countries were that of colonization, resistance and wars.
- African Union, have several Protocols on establishment of Peace & security in our continent.
- SALWs including landmines have recently engaged the attention of African Heads of States, Durban, RSA 8/7/02 & Lome, Togo July 2000
- Issues of Nuclear weapons acquisition not much discussed, rather nuclear capabilities for power generation.
- Article VII of Nuclear NPT-1975
- States may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
- Other regional treaties; Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok
- Pelindaba treaty
- Verification –IAEA inspections & other safeguards
- Long Lasting treaties, but States could pull out on notice:-3mths for Tlatelolco & 12mths for others

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone & Africa

- OAU meeting Cairo July 1964
- 1st UN GA resolution 1965
- Treaty of Pelindaba-Open for signatories since 11th April 1996.
- Yet to go into force compared to other regional treaties.

Open	Tlatelolco 17-02-67	Rarotonga 6-08-85	Bangkok 15-12-95
Force	23-10-02	11-12-86	27-03-97

Treaty of Pelindaba

- Pelindaba-S Africa town, approx 33km west of Pretoria.Site for SA nuclear weapons installation.
- The word from; *Pelile* = finished
Indaba = discussion
- 28 Countries out of the 50 signed to ratified the treaty

Outlines

- Prohibits:-research, devl't ,manufacture, stockpile, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices
- Dumping of radioactive waste in African zone by Treaty parties.
- Attacks against nuclear installations
- Full scope of IAEA Safeguards & mechanism to verify compliance
- Establishment of African Commission on Nuclear Energy

Protocols

- I: Not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive device against treaty parties. Invited USA,France, UK, Russia & PR China
- II: Not to test or assist or encourage the testing of nuclear explosive device in African zone. Invited USA,France, UK, Russia & PR China
- III: treaties in respect to dependent territories. E.g Spain & France

South African Experience

Courtesy of Global Leadership Foundation of fmr President FW De Klerk

- Had nuclear capability in the 1970s



- 7 nuclear fission devices at Pelindaba & Valindaba.
- Finished weapons were stored at Advena

Reasons:

- Hostile neighbours- war with Angola 1987
 - Deterrence to Soviet & Cuban backed Angola
 - Internationally isolated, so no nuclear weapon country would come to SA help should they be attacked.
- Pelindaba-Valindaba from GlobalSecurity.org

Nigeria

- Rumoured to have nuclear weapons. **Biafra in 60s**
- Signed NPT on 1st July 1968
- Ratified on 27 Sept 1968
- 1997 proposed unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT
- Signed CTBT 2000 & ratified by 2001
- Called for multilateral negotiations on total elimination of nuclear weapons on 8 Oct 2003

Nigeria & Nuclear weapons Controversies

- Romance with North Korea 2004
VP meet-to share nuclear tech → peace keeping
→ Terr security
Nuclear Missiles technology
Ammunitions
- IAEA
Research centres at ABU Zaria & Abuja
At a cost of **\$390,000**
2015 Target for electricity generation

How we became NWFZ

- No African State is under threat of attack by Nuclear weapons Country??
(Some Arab Countries in Africa feel threatened by Israel but Libya & Algeria ractified the Pelindaba Treaty)
- Unipolar world, after the collapse of the Berlin wall & the Soviet Union-ending the cold war.
- Cost
- Signatories to NPT & other treaties-Pelindaba
- Discouragment from 'superpowers'
- Satisfication with alternative weapons

South Africa

SA dismantled theirs by 1989 :-

- moved rapidly to address the root cause of their domestic conflicts-Nonracial constitutional democracy
- Threat of their Soviet backed Neighbour receded
- Abandonment of the enrichment process assisted in improved relation with Africa and the International Community.
- Acceded to NPT by 10-07-91 & signed safegaurd aggrement with IAEA on 16-09-91

Nigeria

- Threatened with sanctions in 2004
- Different Political priorities
- Effective alternative-SALWs used to settle regional conflicts e.g Liberia, Sierra Leone
- Cost



- No apparent threats from neighbours/enemies
- Leader & role model for other countries

Summary

Political history of African countries was that of colonization, resistance and wars.

African Union, have several Protocols on establishment of Peace & security in our continent.

Organization of Africa Unity, meeting in Cairo July 1964 discussed the need to make Africa a Nuclear weapon free zone. This received a boost from USA and at the General Assembly of the United Nations with a resolution to this effect was made in 1965.

Treaty of Pelindaba was opened for signatories since 11th April 1996, but only 28 Countries out of the 50 in Africa have ratified this agreement.

Becoming a Nuclear weapon free zone was necessary for Africa especially after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, there are no apparent threats by Nuclear weapons states.

South Africa demonstrated their commitment to the NPT and Pelindaba treaties by dismantling their nuclear weapons plant in 1989.



Dr. Ime Akpan John, a Nigerian general practitioner and consultant in public health with special interest in injury prevention, small arms and conflicts prevention. He is currently a Co-President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).

Dr. John graduated as a medical doctor from University Jos, Nigeria in February 1992 and practiced as a General Physician for eleven years.

By June 2004; he earned a Master in public health (Safety promotion) from Karolinska Institute. In October 2004, he was a Visiting Research Scientist at the Division of Social Medicine of Karolinska Institute; Stockholm where his proposed PhD studies within injury prevention is currently under review.

Ime joined the Society of Nigerian Doctors for the Welfare of Mankind SNDWM, Nigerian Affiliate of IPPNW as a Student in 1989 and has been active since then. He served as the Students Representative of his Affiliate and rose from that position to become the Vice-President /International Councillor for the Nigerian Affiliate. He also served as the Vice-President for the African region 2002-2006. Ime co- initiated the multinational injury surveillance pilot project that hopes to study injuries related to small arms and establish surveillance systems in hospitals/Countries that do not have one.

Dr. John belongs to several Organisations including the Nigerian Action Network against Small Arms (NANSA), International Society for Violence and Injury Prevention (ISVIP) and International Action Network against Small Arms (IANSA).



PROLIFERATION OF WMD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MAIN CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Werner VAN GENT, Correspondent Swiss Radio, Athen, Greece

It has been almost exactly three years ago, that the so called “Global Islamic Media Front” GIMF published a so called fatwa, a religious ruling. This fatwa was probably one of the most frightening publications I have ever seen. The GIMF is something like the News agency of the Qaeda, and this specific Fatwa was issued by Sheikh Naser bin Hamad al Fahd, a Saudi cleric, one of the ideological pillars of the Qaeda network. The prevailing opinion amongst most Islamic scholars and teachers, including Iranian Shiite spiritual leaders is that Islam does not allow the use of WMD. In his fatwa Sheikh Naser pointed out that the use of WMD actually **is** allowed in the holy global war, the Qaidat al Jihad. The fact that the author of this fatwa, who is only 43 years old, only a couple of months later had been arrested by the Saudi authorities, provide us with little comfort; the word was out, atomic bombs and all kind of WMD **can** be used in the global war against the infidels, even if this might cost the lives of Muslims. The crucial part of this fatwa reads as follows:

“If the Muslims could defeat the infidels only by using these kinds of weapons, it is allowed to use them even if they kill them all, and destroy their crops and cattle”

Sheikh al Fahd uses three arguments:

1st the west is not a subject to the Devine law Islam

2nd western countries, including Israel, already possess WMD, Muslim fighters therefore have to defend themselves accordingly

3rd according to the Hadith, the holy Prophets says *“Allah has ordered you to do everything perfectly. Hence, if you kill, do it perfectly, and if you slaughter, do it perfectly. Everyone should sharpen his blade and ease his slaughter”*

And what is more efficient in slaughtering, than a nuclear weapon?

The fear that terrorist might obtain WMD through anti western regimes is therefore the basic guideline in the non proliferation debate - in the case of North Korea but especially in the case of Iran. However, the West is not speaking about abolishing nuclear weapons altogether, but partially. That’s the weak point of the story unfortunately, its, as we heard yesterday, its like a smoker who is lobbying against smokers...It would be more convincing if some Western powers world abolish a part of their arsenal as well...

Now, if you ask around, can proliferation be stopped, the answer normally is negative, because in the Middle east there is one consensus, everybody thinks in terms of the worst case scenario. That doesn’t make thinks easier.

But lets have a closer look at what is happening. Analysis of Middle Eastern conflicts almost always starts with the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; this conflict is regularly regarded as the Nucleus of all conflicts in the Middle East. Many people in the Middle East would like to put this conflict as the Basis of all evil – resulting in the wish that the disappearance of Israel would solve all problems. I think this is distracting us from what I regard as the real *main conflict* in the region. I’m not saying that the injustice done to the Palestinian people is not in itself a basic source of violence in the region, and I am not saying that the fear of the Israelis towards terrorist attacks is not real. For the time being I would prefer to analyse the basic conflicts in the Middle East on a somewhat different level.

I think that the *main conflict* is still the continuation of a many ages old conflict between East & West, a conflict between to totally different worlds of thoughts, a conflict of which has always been dominated by the struggle for natural resources. Now: don’t panic, please, I’m not an advocate of the well known Theory of a Clash of Civilisation, actually I do regard this very theory of mr. Huntington is not a *description but rather a illustration of the basic conflict, which has a lot to do with intentional misunderstanding.*

Lets go a little bit back into history.

It was the Ottoman Empire, which in the late middle ages was the main representative of Islam, which blocked for many centuries the road to wealth for Europe. The silk & spice roads were totally controlled by the empire, Muslim tribes would transport these commodities over land through endless deserts. The cost of these commodities raised, the more western Europe was in demand. The crusades tried to solve this militarily, with the liberation of the Holy Land as a



sacred pretext, but they failed, as we all know. The expansion of the Muslim World became a real threat to the western world.

After the disaster of the crusades Western Europe was desperate for an alternative route for its trade, preferable over sea. It was only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 that the search for an alternative to the trade routes through the Middle East, almost by accident, opened the way to the discovery of the incredible richness of a new continent in the very west, the Americas...

This discovery resulted in a giant robbery accompanied by massacres and genocides and in the end we can observe an enormous influx of silver and gold, from this point we can observe a rapid development of the western world and the decline of the Muslim East in military and economic terms. The Eastern economy was not ready to deal with the new economic reality; it resulted in a tsunami of inflation in the East. Interestingly the Eastern world in those days never really realized the importance of the discovery of the Americas, because the Ottoman Empire was too much involved with its own expansion. In the same way the East did not really realize the importance of another crucial development in the West, the invention of the mechanical way of reproduction. For the East reproducing the Word of God with mechanical means was identical to an instrument of the devil.

Sultan Beyazit actually forbid the use of printing machines, printing was only partly liberated in the 19 century, whereas in the western world within 65 years after the first printing machines were developed at the end of the 14th century, all known ancient Greek and Roman scripts had been reproduced. Without this development no renaissance, no reformation and no enlightenment would ever have been possible in the West. The rapid reproduction of all kind of texts resulted in a free circulation of Ideas, that again resulted in a dramatic change in the role which the church played in society, religion had not any longer the monopoly of thought & science.

On the eastern side of the world splendid isolation prevailed with an economy which was largely directed by the sultan and therefore automatically by divine wish. Science and philosophy remained strictly connected to religion. As a result the tremendous rich culture of the east, the Arab, Turkish and Persian remained stuck in its economic, social and scientific development, *this is basic conflict* we are facing till today.

I would like to stress one thing: I am *not* valuating one world over the other; the sociological structures of the eastern societies were definitely in many aspects superior to the wild world of the west. Culturally the East has always been the source of inspiration. But today the success of a society is basically ranked according to economic and scientific development. In both fields the eastern world, the Muslim world could not and cannot compete with the West. No Arab university has produced any Nobel price winners in positive science, no university in the Muslim world has become famous because of fundamental scientific research, Arab scientists have been receiving the highest nominations only when working at western universities.

This leads to a tremendous tension especially among the young male population of the Eastern, Muslim world. They have been educated in holy medreses and Qu'ran schools in the conviction that a Muslim fulfilling all his duties of Islam automatically becomes part of the divine world, part of the strongest and most powerful rule on earth, he becomes part of God. And then, these young people are confronted with the brutal reality, which not even doesn't respect their categories of justice and faith but flatly *denies* dealing with these things, because religion in the more or less secular west has become a *private* matter of the so called autonomous individual. In Islam religion is no private matter, it is public, actually the division between private and public spheres, as we know, does not exist in the East. Individual rights are connected to groups, to families, or tribes. The conflict of these two world results in what I would like to call Islamic Regression, which is the withdrawal of the subjects on its own roots and fundaments, connected with a total *denial* of all western values. This is not something new, not something of the recent years. Actually the first movement of this kind was observed on the Indian subcontinent in the nineteen twenties. Confronted with a very aggressive and arrogant colonial rule by the British a Muslim movement, which totally denied all western values rapidly developed. From here we can observe a direct connection to the Muslim brotherhood originally founded in the Egyptian town of Ismaila, where the French ruled in a way not much different from the way the British ruled in India and from the Muslim brotherhood there is a direct connection to the terrorist of the Qaeda, which developed in the environment of the Wahabism, an extremely fundamentalist world of thoughts and presently the dominant Ideology in Saudi Arabia

The Qaeda is the complete denial of the west. It divides the world in the House of Islam and the House of War. It's an ideological reaction to a deeply routed frustration resulting from the confrontation with the west. Al Qaeda leaders



like Al Zawahiri, or Osama Bin Laden have been educated and have lived in westernised environments. They know the west and they totally reject the west.

The dominant weapon of these groups has been suicide. Suicide is a victory in the total defeat. It is total sacrifice. Suicide is not propagated by Islam. And actually, Muslim societies produce less suicide cases than for instance Switzerland. However, in face of total collective failure and the desperation, political suicide must be regarded as a result of the basic conflict, we are speaking about.

Nobody can *forbid* suicide. Suicide war is therefore extremely asymmetrical. Unfortunately the confrontation of young Muslims with a very aggressive western world produces an almost endless reservoir of people willing to sacrifice themselves. Americans in Afghanistan, in Iraq, Israeli Forces attacking Gaza, it all leads to more frustration, to more violence.

After 9/11 the US have started their war on terrorism. With this the US has done exactly what the Qaeda and all Qaedas of the world actually are praying for. The US therefore is stuck with its war of retaliation. It is a war of retaliation; otherwise one cannot understand the pictures coming out of Guantanamo. But one thing should be clear, the US cannot win this war, never. The reason is simple: the more it retaliates, the more it provokes blind reactions in an extremely asymmetrical war.

Now, where is Iran positioned in this basic conflict? Of course Mr. Ahmadinejad tried very hard to become, what no Shiite leader had succeeded so far, to become a spokesperson and leading power of the whole Muslim world. But that's not the whole story. To understand the phenomenon of Mr Ahmadinejad, one has again to go back a bit in history, to be precise to the 1980, to the Iran Iraq war. The Iranians resisted the Iraqi attack without much outside help, to tremendous costs, in terms of human beings and in economic terms. After eight years both countries were at the brink of total collapse. I myself reported about this war and I have visited on several occasions the front in this longest war of the 20th century. This war is absolutely crucial in understanding the reaction of Iran today. The war was imposed upon Iran but at the same time it helped Imam Chomeiny to cement the rule of the clerics over Iranian society. The nation was in danger, that was the picture, David fighting against Goliath, a lonely country fighting against the rest of the world, exactly as the third Imam Hussein was fighting against the overwhelming power of the Arrogant Omayyads in the 8th century. This is one of the central myths of the Shia religion. The modern Husseinis were repairing their F 4 Phantoms without any American help, they were flying American Boeings and American choppers although an embargo had imposed on its economy, this was the stuff the Mullahs could work with, they *did* work with it and, what is more important, they *succeeded*. The Islamic Republic of Iran overcame the arrogance of the World; this is the central message of Iranian propaganda in those black and bloody days in the 1980ties.

Now we see Mahmoud Ahmadinejad again fighting against the arrogance of the world powers that want to destroy the Islamic republic. Ahmadinejad's personal background is the Iran Iraq war, in which he served as a commander of the Pasdaran. His electorate are the Pasdaran-forces, their families and the volunteers of the Basij movement. This war is their life, politics a mere continuation of that war with other aims. This is extremely important to understand. The Mullahs are no madmen, Ahmadinejad himself is no madman, he just doesn't understand the west and what is more important he denies understanding the west, as the west denies understanding this very eastern country. There is no discourse whatsoever. Here we are back at the basic conflict between east and west, as I described in the beginning. Ahmadinejad's spiritual background is the extreme view of ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a view which goes back to the Hojratieh movement, founded in the 1950ies, a movement, which is deeply convinced, that the hidden Mahdi, the Messiah of the Shia, will return to earth in order to bring peace and justice, *only after the world has sunk in disarray, chaos and bloodshed*. It's quite a dangerous theory, especially if somebody who has these convictions is going nuclear.

And Iran **is** going nuclear; I personally am absolutely convinced of this. Just try to put yourself in the position of a generation, which has grown up with the ideology of the imposed war, a war imposed on a just and sacred society by the arrogant reaction, by western powers and, of course, the Zionist regime...doesn't it make sense that this nation is defending itself with all means it can obtain.

When I ask my Iranian friends, whether Iran is going to build the bomb, they all say, no, of course not, but actually why shouldn't we???

Exactly as Iran survived the bloodiest war after the Second World War, it now has to prove its abilities to develop nuclear technology with a ambiguity of building the bomb. Haven't we heard this story before? Its something like keeping a fleet of F 4 in the air, despite all sorts of embargos. Iran has to prove its technological capability. Its all about national pride.



So let's just for a second or two assume, Iran indeed develops an atomic bomb.

The one million dollar question is how to convince Tehran, not to continue on the path of nuclear self-defence, to stick to the NPT.

First of all, I still hope that the relevant decision makers in Washington and Jerusalem will think twice or even better, three times until they start a new bombing war, because this will draw the region definitely in an even more violent series of conflicts.

Repercussions of a bombing raid on Iran would be severe:

1 in Iraq the Shia might with assistance from Iran turn against the allied British and American forces, who might be not able to defend themselves sufficiently, this would seriously worsen the present civil war situation

2 if the situation in Iraq deteriorates even more, an even more violent regional war might start, drawing Arab Sunni forces into the game. Some people are even speaking about an alliance of horror, i.e. an alliance between the Saudis and Israel against Shia forces, it sounds absurd, but reality can be absurd indeed...

3 the situation in Lebanon would almost certainly boil over again

The prospects of a regime change in Iran are remote; this is one of the many lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war...

How to stop Israel and US to start bombing has a lot to do with answering the question how to stop Iran going on in developing a bomb. The answer lies in the question how we are dealing with the basic conflict between East and West, a conflict which results in total distrust with all sides loudly proclaiming that the other side has to do the first step in the same time preparing for the worst case scenario. That's exactly the situation in which extremists are happy...

We have to take into account this basic conflict; there is no way around that. The west has to understand the frustrations and fears of the east. Integration versus separation is the key issue. First of all putting preconditions to talks should be skipped, as Hans Blix recently pointed out very wisely. Stop to use humiliation as a political tool. Generally starting talking only after the other side has given in is no good basis, Iranian diplomacy should be advised about that as well, it's all about the art of diplomacy. There are two schools. One is the Clausewitz approach, which regards military force as part of the negotiation process, the other is a bit more difficult, it's about developing a win/win situation with a certain amount of compromise. The Europeans started with these, but then abandoned it, Iran must have been confused, first to speak to EU, then to E3 and then only to P5+1. I call this a disaster of diplomacy

A sound European approach setting up a win/win situation would be to connect economic cooperation with certain compromises by Teheran, without humiliation but also without self-humiliation. It's a difficult instrument, especially if the US and Israel are loudly speaking about bombing raids.

Economic force is applied. Presently a number of international Banks like Credit Suisse, ABN, UBS, Standard Chartered, have been forced to withdraw from making business with Iran because of the "*Iran freedom and Support act*". This US legislation is strictly domestic but can be used against any entity doing business with Iran over 20 million US \$. That means that it became virtual impossible to invest in the energy sector in Iran. Japan withdraw it plans to operate the huge Azadegan oilfield. This kind of pressure can provoke a serious energy crisis in Iran but no collapse of the regime. I repeat: As long as economic pressure is used as a weapon to *destroy or to humiliate* a regime, it will never work, not in Iran, not in Gaza, not in the rest of the Middle East. I'm not saying that economic pressure should not be applied, but it should be applied within a diplomatic framework, in which both sides can develop a win/win situation, the only sound basis for diplomatic success.

You might ask, with the ideology of an Ayatollah like Mesbah Yazdi, who deeply disgusts everything coming from the west, how someone could realistically expect that these people ever would enter into serious talks with the west? I can assure you there have been numerous occasions where the regime in Tehran actually was begging for open and direct talks, directly after the 2003 Iraq invasion for instance. The response from the US has always been negative. Iran, the Iranian regime is not only Ahmadinejad and even Ahmadinejad might turn his political confrontation course at the very moment he sees that this course is not yielding the result he goes for. The basic problem of Iran remains the economy of a rapidly growing, young population, the lack of direct investment, the brain & money drain. Nuclear plants might look like to give an answer to these problems, domestically in Iran, I personally do not think this will work and I'm



pretty sure the population in Iran will very soon develop second thoughts about the strong emphasis its leadership lays on nuclear development.

Ladies and gentlemen, the West needs a stable Iran as Iran needs the west to remain economically stable. Or to say differently: the East needs the West, as the West needs the East today as much as it needed it thousand years ago, in those days it was the access to the richness of the east, to Silk and Spices, today it is the access to energy and, that is something totally new, access to new commodity: *stability in a middle east with less rather than with more WMD.*



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- 1983 regular correspondent for Tages-Anzeiger (Zürich), Berner Zeitung (Bern and Luzerner Neueste Nachrichten)
- 1984 besides newspaper correspondences also free lance correspondent for Swiss Radio for Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Iran
- 1993 besides newspaper and radio free lance correspondent for Swiss TV
- 1995 regular correspondent for Swiss Radio and Swiss TV
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PROLIFERATION THREAT: THE CHALLENGES OF IRAN-US RELATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTING A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (WMD FZ ME)

**Statement by Dr. S.H. MOUSAVIAN, Deputy President for International Studies
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By and large, the Non-proliferation system has been successful in barring nuclear proliferation. Apart from North Korea, no other signatory to NPT is known to have developed nuclear weapons.

Today, when discussing proliferation threats apart from North Korea and Iran in the media and politics, there is usually reference made to

- 1) A network of trafficking in sensitive nuclear-related technology,
- 2) Loop holes in the Non-proliferating system.
- 3) The fear of nuclear or other WMD terrorism

These three issues are regarded as the structural threats for proliferation of WMD

The law and order approach to remedy these threats are the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on strengthening non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and preventing access to them by terrorist groups. However, a law and order approach has only limited chance of success in meeting the challenge of the perceived threat of proliferation.

It is absolutely critical that time and energy is invested to promote the authority and credibility of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, it is in the interest of humanity if those reluctant among the nations are persuaded to join the NPT, thus further strengthening non-proliferation and disarmament.

Iran

Re. Iran, one wonders if the threat of proliferation is not partly blown out of proportion for ulterior motives by some in Washington. Such a proposition may not be correct politically, particularly in the prevailing environment, when North Korea has tested and Iran's file is in the Security council, ostensibly for threat of proliferation. However, the zealotry displayed by the US in the last three years to derail Iran's nuclear issue from the IAEA and negotiating track and the rush to turn Iran's cases into an international crisis seem motivated less by a real concern about proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran and more by a historic grudge and desire to take revenge for the unresolved bilateral problems and to divert attention from the US fiasco in Iraq and the greater Middle East (ME). Some arguments to support this contention:

1. 115 heads of states and governments of the Non Aligned Movement sympathize with Iran and regard the Western treatment of this case as double standard and discriminatory and virtually bullying Iran. In our opinion, nothing is further away from the truth than the often repeated statement by American officials that "this is not between US and Iran, but between the world and Iran".
2. Most countries of the world, particularly all developing and some industrial countries, find it difficult to buy the American story about Iran. The worst case scenario presented by American and Israeli intelligence is that Iran is pursuing a weapons program and that it is 7 to 10 years away from it.
3. Voices in the US National Security council consider Iran as "single agreed enemy, that can serve as the organizing point of reference for policies throughout the region" for the US; Israel and traditional governments of predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. This trilateral strategy serves the perceived policy interests of the US, Israel and the three mentioned Arab States.
4. Iran's nuclear issues needs to be resolved through persuasion, cooperation and engagement. Such an approach must have a triple prong strategy for negotiations that would proceed hand in hand in a mutually reinforcing process: 1) Nuclear negotiations, 2) Iran-US bilateral negotiations and 3) a structured forum to negotiate a regional security arrangement for the Persian Gulf with ripple effects for the whole ME.

Nuclear Negotiations

Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities are found by the IAEA to have not diverted to a prohibited program must, at the end of the day and in real security calculation, serve as a point of confidence and assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's program and not the opposite. Confrontation and bullying can potentially cause unnecessary pain but will



unlikely easily achieve their expressed goal of stopping Iran's nuclear program in light of the technical know how and capability gained. The world is watching how Iran's nuclear file will be addressed. It is critically important for the fate of the non-proliferation regime and the WMD treaties, and the future security orientation of most developing states to see whether the Security Council can muster the courage, wisdom and fairness to be bound by the letter and spirit of the law, avoid the temptation of "real politik" which is taking the easy way out, and try to resolve the issue creatively in a manner that everyone would win.

Regional Security Arrangement / Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

No region in the world could have more dividends for international peace and security than does the ME by establishing a WMDFZ. Support for establishing such a zone is abundant. However, practical progress to that end is far less than encouraging. Annual UN General Assembly resolution on establishing a WMDFZ ME have for years been adopted unanimously, with occasional abstentions of only the US and Israel. This is unlike most other resolutions relative to the ME!

Now, after more than thirty years, establishing a WMDFZ in the ME has gained a logic and an intellectual momentum of its own. The process of establishing a WMDFZ in the ME can potentially facilitate a security arrangement and help find a just peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Baumgart Claudia and Muller Harald, A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky? The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-05, p 57).

The fact that Israel has 100- 200 nuclear weapons in its arsenal is argued to have accorded Israel a false confidence and the audacity to reject any peace plan that is just and fair without any hesitation. The establishment of a WMDFZ in the ME can theoretically remove this Israeli resistance and make it more receptive to a genuine and just peace process. The Israeli argument that its nuclear weapons is the final deterrent against the Arabs and the Iranians should find no receptive ear, because the balance of conventional power, as shown in the previous wars, is in Israeli favor. Additionally, the bipartisan policy of the US, as the only super power, is to ensure a strategic edge for Israel and to ensure its military superiority in the region. It would be hard to think, that the US is unable to ensure that security edge for Israel without it having a nuclear arsenal of its own. Therefore establishing a WMDFZ in the ME has a direct bearing on a just peace process in the Arab- Israeli conflict and could potentially encourage Israel to abandon its intransigence and become more receptive to such a process.

Today most analysts, however, agree that implementing a WMDFZ or NWFZ in the ME is far fetched. It needs incremental measures, change of heart and mind, confidence building measures and a courageous resolve to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of wars, to borrow from the UN charter. Here is a non-exhaustive, interrelated and mutually reinforcing list of steps to facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in the ME:

General Steps towards a NWFZ ME

Measures to promote respect for and implementation of the NPT;

Measures to strengthen the non-proliferation system;

Measures to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and compliance by NWS to their obligations:

Specific steps towards a NWFZ ME

1. Progress on a NWFZ or a WMDFZ in the ME is possible when there is a reasonable degree of assurance for long-term peace.
2. Be creative but not ambitious in devising confidence-building measures on security issues in the ME
3. Arrange for mid-level, regional governmental expert meetings to discuss and try to agree on political and future security requirements, when negotiations for a NWFZ in the ME could be constructive. For this step to be useful, participation of all states, including Iran and Arab nations in the region that do not recognize Israel must be secured. To jump-start this process, creativity and flexibility ought to lead the way. Perhaps the easiest way would be to have the UN to arrange and hold such meetings in which Arabs and Iranians usually participate.
4. Develop a political concept for a cooperative monitoring as a confidence building measure towards a NWFZ or a WMDFZ in the framework of a regional security arrangement in the ME (see M.B. Kalinowski, Steps towards a WMDFZ in the ME, INESAP). This governmental expert group may come up with an agreed text for non-intrusive



verification of a possible NWFZ in the ME. The subject is appealing to the Arab states and Iran and since consensus is necessary, enough assurance is present that all view, including those of Israel, will be taken on board. Membership of the zone, states that need to ratify the zone before it becomes enforceable and the extent and scope of peaceful uses of nuclear technology within the context of the current international debate on fuel-cycle facilities and technology could also be subject of discussion within the governmental group. This process will be purely exploratory and should not be regarded as negotiations. But the possible consensus outcome document on non-intrusive verification of a possible WMDFZ could certainly be useful for future negotiations.

5. The same concept can be built in the context of the Persian Gulf security arrangements. Now that some of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have indicated an interest in developing a peaceful nuclear program, Iran could take the lead in promoting a regional monitoring/verification program supplementing the Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA. Membership of such a program could be extended to Persian Gulf countries with a nuclear program and it could serve to build confidence within the Persian Gulf about the peacefulness of the nuclear programs in the area.

6. As the only state in the region with nuclear weapons, Israel may initially take some steps that are strategically low-risk but symbolically high impact, in order to help begin the process. "Israel should consider shutting down its Dimona nuclear reactor and the associated facilities that make up the core of Israel's nuclear program. Israel must already possess more than enough nuclear material for a sizable deterrent, and the reactor and its periphery must be close to the end of their useful life" (see Baumgart Claudia and Muller Harald, p54).

As far as the NWFZ in the ME is concerned, I wish to point out that now because of the US undue pressure against and abuse of international machinery of the UN, Iran is being considered guilty until proven innocent, Iran may see a more active and forthcoming stance in the process of establishing a NWFZ or a WMDFZ in the ME as at least a circumstantial way of substantiating its innocence and of the peace-fulness of its nuclear energy program. Therefore, there is a window of opportunity to advance the seemingly utopian idea of a NWFZ or WMDFZ in the ME in the midst of heightening situation of Iranian nuclear program and lack of any meaningful initiative on the Arab-Israeli conflict.



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1981-1983 Vice President, Islamic Propagation Organisation, Tehran, Iran.
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1990-1997 Iranian Ambassador to Germany, Bonn, Germany.
1997-2004 Head of Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council of Iran (SNSC).
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NUCLEARIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST - FROM THREAT TO PREVENTIVE ACTION

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(Summary by Prof. Nidecker)

Introduction

As the geopolitical environment in the Middle East can change rapidly, the Nuclear threat could indeed become serious in the Middle East. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is getting worse and the more instability in these two states, the more deterioration of security of the other states. The nuclear crisis involving Iran and the persistent Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be deescalated through constructive dialogue of all state and non-state parties involved, although the distrust and enmity between the parties drawn in these complicated conflicts have made the task of finding peaceful solutions daunting. The nuclear threats are real and are not an imagination of fearful minds. It is not constructive to adopt the rhetoric of fear, but the risks of disregarding nuclear threats are intolerable. Since the consequence of inaction will be unbearable for the international community, we need concerted efforts to take preventive actions. I shall address the following questions in my presentation: 1-What are the nuclear threats in the Middle East? 2- What measures are useful in stopping the nuclearization of the Middle East? 3-What are the options in dealing with regional nuclear threats?

Three sets of issues have had tremendous impact on the nuclearization of the region: First, the existence of the “secret” Israel’s nuclear arsenal is viewed as destabilizing by the other regional states. Second, most Middle East states are unhappy with the nuclear policies of the UK and the US as the two major nuclear powers militarily involved in the region. Their nuclear targeting policies as well as their insistence on an enhanced nuclear deterrence have a significant impact on the region’s nuclearization. Instead of working toward nuclear disarmament, the two major powers have decided to develop new nuclear programs. The Middle Eastern states believe that the nuclear-armed countries are doing nothing to devalue nuclear weapons. The third set of factors is related to the determination of Iran and other regional states to invest in nuclear power reactors; and the subsequent concern that this trend might increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. Given these facts, the most probable nuclear threats in the Middle East will be discussed in the following section.

Nuclear Accidents and Incidents

As of 31 December 2005, there were 443 nuclear power reactors in operation in the world.¹ However, there is only one nuclear reactor in operation in Israel, and another one under construction in the Bushehr province of Iran. According to Israeli scientists such as Uzi Eben who had been involved in Israel’s nuclear program, the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert is an accident waiting to happen. These experts have said that aged nuclear facilities as old as Dimona (which began operation in 1960) are shut down in other countries because of the health risks involved.² Since Dimona is not under the IAEA safeguards, its continued operation could have radiation-related health effects for the Israelis who live in the immediate areas surrounding Dimona. It could also be a second Chernobyl causing catastrophic harm to people and the environment. Despite the fact that this reactor is known to be unstable, no action is taken for a public investigation of its safety.³

Iran likely will not be the only Middle Eastern state or OPEC member who will invest in civilian nuclear energy program. Other oil-rich states will follow in Iran’s footsteps soon.⁴ There are already indications that 11 out of 12 members of the OPEC have plans to use their oil wealth to create a secure future when their oil and gas runs out. The rise in crude oil prices has become a strong incentive for developing new energy sources. By using nuclear energy for domestic consumption, these states will have more oil and gas resources for export.

No Arab country currently has a nuclear energy capability but several engage in nuclear research and most Arab states are intent to pursue peaceful nuclear energy program.⁵ President Mubarak of Egypt discussed nuclear cooperation with Russia and PRC during his visits to Moscow and Beijing in November 2006. The six Gulf Cooperation Council leaders said that “the states of the region have a right to possess nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes ... within the context of the pertinent international agreements.”⁶ There is the general opinion nuclear energy to “supplement the vast amounts of oil and gas needed for desalination, turning sea water into drinking water.”⁷ Persian Gulf Arab states would have their own nuclear power reactors within a decade. Intriguingly, Iranian President Ahmadinejad has said that “Iran is ready to give its valuable experiences and achievements in peaceful nuclear technology to the countries of the region.” The reason Ahmadinejad has welcomed the “decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to acquire peaceful nuclear technology”,⁸ is that this move will lessen regional pressure on Iran to halt its own program. ”⁹ US allies like Jordan and Turkey also want to develop nuclear energy programs. Jordan’s king Abdullah II said in an interview with an



Israeli newspaper that “The Egyptians are looking for a nuclear program. The GCC are looking at one...the rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region.” As for Turkey, Ankara wants to build three nuclear power plants by 2015.¹⁰ The Turks complain that the environmentalists do concern themselves with the environmental hazards of the four Bulgaria’s nuclear power plants and or Armenia’s Metamor nuclear reactor which are close to Turkish borders, but stage protests in front of Turkey’s Atomic Energy Institute.¹¹ I am not sure if the regional states are ready to bear the economic and human costs of dealing with moderate natural disasters, let alone those of the nuclear incidents and accidents. A related issue is the question of what happens if the non-state actors get hold of material needed for making a ‘dirty bomb’ or a crude nuclear device. How do we keep nuclear material used in these reactors from falling into the hands of terrorists?

Nuclear Proliferations Risks

Nuclearization of any one country in any region will provide a rationale for other governments to acquire the same capability. It is widely known that Israeli nuclear warheads could be launched by missiles or submarines to most Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, it makes sense for Iran and other non-nuclear states to be on their guard against Israeli nuclear threat. Of course, the irony is that the nuclear-armed Israel which is not under IAEA safeguards calls the non-nuclear weapon state of Iran the primary regional nuclear threat. The head of the Israeli Defense Forces intelligence, Major-General Aharon Zeevi warned that Iran’s nuclear program will get to the “point of no return” by the summer of 2003. Moreover, he claimed that Saudi Arabia was planning to purchase nuclear warheads from Pakistan.¹² Israeli leaders have kept urging the US to intensify pressures on Iran. Israeli government has tried to instill fear in the hearts and minds of regional governments that a nuclear Iran is capable of destabilizing the entire region. This kind of argument has been made by Israel for years. In essence, this argument is based on the assumption that nuclear monopoly of Israel does not threaten regional stability, and no other regional states should acquire the same capability.

To what extent the presence of a nuclear armed Israel has accelerated regional arms race? Will the introduction of a second nuclear capable state have a negative impact on the regional balance of power or regional stability? The answer depends on who answers the question. The Israelis view Iran’s potential nuclear capability as the most serious issue facing their nation and even an existential threat. The Israeli politicians have even threatened Iran that they will destroy Iran’s nuclear reactor similar to the 1981 attack on Iraqi Osirak reactor. If you ask the Middle Eastern Arabs, Persians and the Turks, they believe the Israeli concern reflects their self-interest in preserving their own military superiority by keeping Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Abdul Rahman Al Awadi, the head of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), and the man in charge of disaster planning in the event of a nuclear accident in the Persian Gulf visited the Bushehr reactor accompanied by a regional delegation made up of two experts from each of the six GCC member countries. After the visit, he identified “The increase of shipping traffic in the narrow Gulf as greater threats to the region than Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”¹³

The Iranian leaders have been insisting that Iran does not have nor want nuclear weapons and has no intention to abandon its civilian nuclear program. The argument in favor of the expansion of a civilian nuclear industry is that Iran is the 4th largest crude oil exporter, but it does not have enough oil refining capability on its soil. As a result, Iran has to import 40% of the 70 million liters of gasoline it needs for domestic consumption. Importing gasoline is costly because the government subsidizes fuel. The cheap fuel has encouraged illegal trade in fuel to neighbor countries such as Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey.

Regional nuclear arms race

There are two major factors which might encourage a nuclear race in the Middle East: 1) Economics of Defense—Because of the high cost of a major program of conventional force modernization, nuclear weapons or other unconventional weapon types may become more attractive to the Middle Eastern states.

2) Political value of nuclear weapons— Security of nations cannot be measured by the volume or the technological advancement of the weapons acquired. But weapons can be a political tool for coercion or to get concessions from the great powers. If Israel and Pakistan are not stopped now, they will continue R&D in the direction of producing more destructive nuclear weapons. Despite Israel’s claim that “it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East”, its nuclear capability could represent an effective preemptive strike force.¹⁴ Abdul Rahman Al Attiyah, secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council urged the international community to press for sanctions on Israel for its nuclear program. Al-Attiyah’s comments followed what appeared to be a disclosure in December 2006 by Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert about Israeli nuclear arsenal.¹⁵ If a nuclear race starts in the region, the result will be more resources diverted to the military sector with an adverse impact on economic development. The weapons imported or produced by domestic arms industry do not bring about real economic benefits, but transfers of technology to enable



arms production may create some jobs and reduce dependency on the outside world, and reduce vulnerability to arms embargoes. The same justification could be presented by those who favor the creation of an independent nuclear capability. Since money is not in short supply in many oil-rich countries, the likelihood of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is much higher than any other developing region.

Deployment of Nuclear-capable Forces in the Region

Due to its post-Cold War military involvement in the region, the US is perceived as a country that has grand designs on the Middle East's destiny. Unlike other major powers, the tangible presence of the US has been felt because of the substantial deployment of US expeditionary forces in the Persian Gulf as well as in NATO or CENTCOM bases. American influence has also been evident through major arms transfers to Israel and its Arab allies, complemented by staging joint war games and maneuvers in the Persian Gulf. Since the war with Iraq in March 2003, foreign military presence has been felt more keenly in the region. No one knows how many nuclear warheads (if any) are deployed in the Middle East, but many have expressed their concern about nuclear accidents on an American or British naval vessel during exercises or routine patrol in the Persian Gulf.

Preemptive Strikes against Nuclear Sites

In June 1981, Menachem Begin, then Prime Minister of Israel, decided to order the aerial bombardment of a French-built nuclear reactor in Iraq.¹⁶ There are some people who believe that Israel would like to see Iran's NPT violation in order to persuade the US and the EU to impose more sanction or even use drastic military means such as aerial strikes against Iran's nuclear sites.¹⁷ The Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear and military facilities will be insanity due to Iran's —as yet unspecified but predictable— retaliatory options. Similar to the Osirak strike of 1981, the Israelis air force might attack Bushehr before the reactor is operational. This risky action may buy time but it will not stop Iran's nuclear program.

Preventive Actions

What are the options in dealing with regional nuclear threats?

1) Intensified Diplomatic Efforts aimed at Trust Building

The lack of trust and uncertainty are at the heart of the problems. The outsiders are saying we have no clue what the Iranian leaders are thinking. It should be clear that the Iranian decision-makers are also faced with uncertainties and cannot find answers to a lot of questions: Will the US attack? Will Israel attack? Will the UNSC impose a more severe sanction on Iran? Will the US establish permanent military bases in Iraq? Will the American companies (like Halliburton) control Iraqi oil and weaken the OPEC? What are the American true intentions in the Persian Gulf? One of the main recommendations of the Iraq Study Group's report was to talk with Syria and Iran.¹⁸ The two sides of any conflict must eventually sit down at a table and communicate directly with one another. They have to realize that threats and coercion are not effective and the US must understand in particular that even a regime change in Iran will not mean that the new Iranian leaders will terminate its nuclear program. Iran has tried to reassure its southern neighbors that it does not constitute a threat to them. In August 2006, the President of Iran, Mahmood Ahmadinejad who is often quoted in the Western press for his controversial statements, said: "Iran is not a threat to any country. Iranians are not a people of aggression and intimidation." He said Iran does not even pose a threat to Israel, and wants to deal with the Palestinian problem peacefully through elections. Iranian officials repeatedly say that Iran has not waged a war against any country in 300 years, but has defended itself against foreign aggression. Clearly, there is a need for trust-building to make these declarations credible for the American leaders. There is also need to concentrate on peaceful resolution of major regional conflicts (e.g., Arab-Israeli conflict) to deal with the threat of nuclearization.

2) Establishment of a new Inclusive Security System in the Persian Gulf

Some initial supporters of the invasion of Iraq are now saying that the war was not worth it. The US military force is trapped in an Iraqi insurgency with no end in sight, but the Neocons are talking about the benefits of waging war against Iran.¹⁹ If Iraq and Afghanistan were not Iran's immediate neighbors, Iranian leaders would have been pleased to see the US failure of stabilizing these war-torn countries. The only other alternative to war is the creation of a new security system. In October 2006, Mohammad Ali Hosseini, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman proposed the creation of a "GCC + Iran+ Iraq" Persian Gulf security system. He repeated Iranian position that the regional states themselves should be responsible for the security of the region so that the foreign powers will not have the excuse to stay in the region.

3) The Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East

We must support the establishment of a NWFZ and persuade all regional states to sign all major arms control



agreements. To some extent, the adherence of all regional states to the NPT and the Additional Protocol might alleviate the fear of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

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Iran and Major Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements and International Arms Control Treaties, as of March 2007

Treaty	Signature	Deposit
Outer Space	27 January 1967	
BWC	10 April 1972	22 August 1973
NPT	1 July 1968	2 February 1970
Partial Test Ban	8 August 1963	5 May 1964
ENMOD*	18 May 1977	—
Sea-Bed	11 February 1971	6 September 1971
CTBT	24 September 1996*	—
1925 Geneva Protocol		5 November 1929
CWC	13 January 1993	3 November 1997

Notes:

- * ENMOD is the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
- * Iran has signed the CTBT with the following declarations: "1. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Treaty does not meet nuclear disarmament criteria as originally intended. We had not perceived a CTBT only as non-proliferation instrument. The Treaty must have terminated fully and comprehensively further development of nuclear weapons. However, the Treaty bans explosions, thus limiting such development only in certain aspects, while leaving other avenues wide open. We see no other way for the CTBT to be meaningful, however, unless it is considered as a step towards a phased program for nuclear disarmament with specific time frames through negotiations on a consecutive series of subsequent treaties.



- ”2. On National Technical Means, based on the deliberation that took place on the issues in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we interpret the text as according a complementary role to them and reiterate that they should be phased out with further development of the International Monitoring System. National Technical Means should not be interpreted to include information received from espionage and human intelligence.
- ”3. The inclusion of Israel in the MESA grouping constitutes a politically-motivated aberration from UN practice and is thus objectionable. We express our strong reservation on the matter and believe that it will impede the implementation of the Treaty, as the confrontation of the States in this regional group would make it tremendously difficult for the Executive Council to form. The Conference of the States Parties would eventually be compelled to find a way to redress this problem.”

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THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE – WHY THE COMING DECADES WILL BE MORE PRECARIOUS THAN THE COLD WAR ERA

Dr. Jochen BITTNER, Political Editor, “die Zeit”, Hamburg, Germany (Summary by Dr. G. Baitsch)

When it comes to questions of life and death, images from the Wild West may be instructive. Let's start with this one: We see two cowboys facing each other with drawn pistols on a dusty road. Both of them know it might be suicide to open fire. So each is wise enough not to shoot.

This, in short, has been the working principle of mutually assured destruction between the two superpowers during the cold war era. But what happens in this precarious though stable situation if an additional gunman enters the stage? Or two? Or three? Who is to deter whom from shooting then?

Exactly this nightmare of nuclear uncertainty is about to become reality. Although the United States and Russia have significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, they are still holding thousand of warheads in stock.

According to the American Arms Control Association, the number of strategic warheads in the USA in 1990 was 10.563, compared to 5966 in 2005. Russia in the same periode has dismantled 5872 of its formerly 10.271 strategic warheads. Yet none of the traditional nuclear powers is really intending to entirely give up their ultimate deterrence. On the contrary. Both the United States and Russia as well as Great Britain, China, and France are modernising their warheads and their strategic launchers capabilities such as submarines and intercontinental missiles. The decision for a new Trident system in Great Britain is just one example. Sure, this modernisation does not include the creation of new bombs. As such, it does not make the world an unsafer place.

The development of so called Bunker Buster bombs by the United State's government though is a different thing. It takes some sophistication to maintain that the creation of these “mini nukes” does not violate the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At the same time, we are monitoring the rise of new nuclear actors whose stability is not as reliable and/or whose intentions are not that easy to calculate: Pakistan, India, North Korea, - and Iran may be in a couple of years. Israel of course is known to possess nuclear weapons but does not officially declare them.

The nuclear state of the world, in short, has changed from a cowboy situation into a desperado situation. Even if the Big Five were to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, the Second Nuclear Age with all its new actors still promises to become much more threatening than the past five decades. Because, at the end of the day, there is only one thing that is more dangerous than many nuclear weapons in the hand of a few, and that is: few nuclear weapons in the hands of many.

Already there are signs that the spread of nuclear weapons will become a chain reaction in itself. Japan and South Korea will certainly not stand idly by while North Korea's awkward dictator builds nuclear missiles.

Just as little will the Sunni rulers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia accept the perspective of a nuclear armed Shiite Iran gaining regional supremacy.

The director of the IAEA, Mohamed Al-Baradei, believes that up to 30 countries have the capability and increasingly the motivation, to develop nuclear weapons. Bluntly put, the question does no longer seem to be if nuclear proliferation will take place, but rather: who's next?

And of course let us not forget the one big threatening actor who does now have own territory but thousands of fanatic followers instead: al Qaida.

On January 31 this year, Henry Kissinger together with a number of other distinguished diplomats, issued an appeal in the Wall Street Journal, urging the US government to take a lead in a speedy and comprehensive disarmament process.

„Apart from the terrorist threat“, Kissinger writes, and I quote, „unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American *mutually assured destruction* with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. (...) Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?“

End of quote.



Of course the world's leaders recognise the new world order of disorder. But out of this analysis they are drawing exactly the opposite consequences than those Kissinger is demanding. They argue that, exactly because the world has become a more dangerous place, it would be outright irresponsible to abstain from the nuclear option. After the shock of 9/11, the US, Great Britain, and France have made clear that to a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction they would respond with a nuclear strike.

With these sentences, the classical concept of deterrence has utterly changed. It has, if you like, become asymmetric to meet the threats that may derive from rouge actors.

Likewise, the Chinese are working to improve their long range ballistic capabilities. Currently about 20 or so Chinese missile are able to reach the United States.

The message of this armament, experts believe, is indeed directed towards Washington. Keep your hands off Taiwan, it says. The Pacific region actually may be the theater where, with some probability tactical nuclear, deterrence might see a revival.

Ivan Oelrich, a weapons expert with the Federation of American Scientists thinks that „it would be difficult for the Chinese to sink an American aircraft carrier in the Street of Taiwan if not with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can compensate for existing weaknesses of the Chinese military and exploit vulnerabilities on US side.” End of quote

Also, below the lethal effects of nuclear weapons there is also the possibility to detonate an atomic bomb in high altitude above a country. The electromagnetic impuls triggered by the explosion would literally paralyse the cities beneath.

In 2002 the Bush government decided not to dismantle the roughly 1000 tactical nuclear weapons which still lie in the vaults, but rather to modify them for appropriate use.

According to the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which is still valid today, the Pentagon has come to the following assessment regarding tactical nuclear bombs:

“Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability.”

It carries on:

“New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage.“

In other words: American nuclear bombs should become smaller and smarter.

The Pentagon argues that the modification of existing weapons does not violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from 1970. This treaty, as you know, obliges all signatory states not to develop new nuclear weapons and to scrap the old ones.

More or less forgotten by the public, between 150 and 180 American tactical bombs from the Cold War are still stored in Europe. About 130 of them are said to rest in Germany, smaller amounts in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. Up till today, the pilots of German Tornado fighter planes are training the use of the aging gravity bombs. They are, or better were, of course, part of Nato's escalation arsenal. They would have been dropped somewhere east of Germany to stop advancing soviet troops. The American president would have had to authorise their use before the German pilots would have delivered them.

Now, not only in Berlin, but also in Washington, a growing number of officials are asking: what are these weapons good for today?

Nato's Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels issued the following Communique on 1 December 2003:

„The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.

They are maintained at readiness levels consistent with the prevailing security environment. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, and reaffirmed the value of this capability.“



But who is supposed to be deterred by old-fashioned nuclear gravity bombs that could hardly be deployed outside Europe?

Actually, not even members of the German Government can come up with any realistic scenario in which the old nukes would make any military sense. For years, members of the opposition parties in the German parliament therefore have been demanding that the bombs be retracted from Europe. Still, the White Paper for the German armed forces, released only a couple of months ago, states that

„For the foreseeable future the Nato alliance will not only need conventionell but also nuclear means of deterrence. (...) The numbers of substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe will be kept on a mininum level, sufficient to maintain peace and stability.“

Behind the scenes of Germany's Grand Coalition though, there are reports about a harsh controversy about the future of Europe's bombs. Behind closed doors, many social democrats are demanding to end Germany's nuclear participation. - Maybe we have to wait until the next election campaign before this conflict will be fought in public.

Until this happens, Europe, it seems, will have to live with an arsenal of expensive and senseless nuclear weapons.

So, with some honesty, as far as the negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program is concerned, the European Union is hardly more credible than a smoker trying to convince others that their behaviour is unhealthy.

On January 17 this year, the Board of Directors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* advanced the hand of the famous Doomsday Clock by two minutes. The clock now stands at five minutes to midnight, meaning that this risk of a nuclear war has never been higher since 1981.

Let me finish with the statement of the Atomic Scientist, which I think very strikingly sums up why the world has become a more dangerous place.

„The second nuclear era, unlike the dawn of the first nuclear age in 1945, is characterized by a world of porous national borders, rapid communications that facilitate the spread of technical knowledge, and expanded commerce in potentially dangerous dual-use technologies and materials.

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy warned of the possibility of the United States facing a world *in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations* would have nuclear weapons.“

It may be about time to take his warning seriously.



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THE PROJECT FOR A GULF ZONE FREE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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Development of the concept

The project of declaring the Middle East as Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is an idea proposed for the first time by the Iranian government in 1974 with the endorsement of the Egyptian government. The formal start of a process for turning the Middle East Zone into a reality enshrined in a treaty has been hostage to the Arab/Israel peace process but the aspiration has been renewed every year in a succession of UNGA resolutions. In 1990 the Egyptian government extended the proposal by announcing the President Mubarak Initiative — that the Middle East Zone should be made free of all weapons of mass destruction.

The Gulf states have shared the general Middle Eastern concern about Israeli WMD capabilities, particularly the universal acceptance of the fact of a significant nuclear weapon capability. However they have over the last twenty years had to live also under the shadow of the Iraqi programmes. Iranian troops suffered severely from Iraqi chemical weapons during the war between those two countries. Concerns for Iraqi WMD were enhanced after the 1991 campaign to relieve Kuwait when UNSCOM inspectors discovered not only a reasonably mature chemical weapons capability but also active development programmes for both nuclear and biological weapons. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 removed this threat and provided the opportunity for the Gulf Research Center project.

The project for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction including the GCC States Iran, Iraq, and Yemen emerged within the Research Department of the GRC in August 2004. The first meeting was held in December 2004 to present the project to regional delegates, the UN, EU, and NATO as well as nuclear non-proliferation and arms control experts. A second meeting on the GWMDfz initiative was held in Stockholm, jointly hosted with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on May 30 and 31, 2005.

In June 2005 the Secretary General of the Arab League issued a statement expressing concern that the proposal for the Gulf Zone might undermine collective Arab efforts to make the entire Middle East region free of all WMD. In December the Government of Kuwait responded that

the call for making the Gulf region free from WMD is necessary and an ... important first step, ...towards the attainment of the objective of declaring the entire Middle East region as free from Weapons of Mass Destruction.

On December 18, 2005 on the eve of convening the twenty-sixth GCC annual summit, whose proceedings started on December 19 in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, the Secretary-General of the GCC, Mr. Abdul Rahman Al Attiya, told a press conference:

I have made a call today pertinent to the necessity of ratifying an accord between the GCC States Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. The objective of this is to make the region free of nuclear weapons and other WMD. An accord of this kind may be conducive to a comprehensive accord involving all Arab and non-Arab countries in the Middle East- by non-Arab countries I mean Israel."

The GRC held a further 'track two' meeting on the issue in Dubai, on May 2-3, 2006, The workshop, co-hosted by VERTIC (The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), was once again attended by officials from the region and experts from international organisations and academia.

The process of building support for a formal negotiation continues.

Issues for consideration in drafting a treaty to create a Gulf Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons to be banned

Included in the 1948 UN definition of "Weapons Of Mass Destruction" are atomic, biological, chemical and radioactive material weapons, together with any new weapons which may be discovered, having destructive power comparable to those listed. However, there seems little need to include "Radioactive material" or "New" weapons in the treaty as these are purely theoretical.

Radiological issues are better covered by a dumping ban, as in the NWFZ treaties.



Basic undertakings

The basic undertakings included in the existing nuclear weapon free zone treaties ‘not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons’ can be modified by simple insertion of biological and chemical weapons. Similarly, the usual references to the right to use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can be reinforced by carefully drafted equivalents for peaceful use of chemicals and of biological technology.

Verification

The principal verification element in NWFZ treaties is a requirement for the application of IAEA Safeguards. In current circumstances this should include not only INFCIRC 153 but also the Additional Protocol INFCIRC 540.

As this Zone also covers Chemical Weapons a balancing reference to OPCW verification activities is needed. Unfortunately there is, at present, no verification system applicable to Biological Weapons.

Negative security assurances

NWFZ treaties normally include a provision for the Nuclear Weapon States to provide undertakings not to use nuclear weapons against states in the Zone. This is done by means of a Protocol

In the case of a Gulf Zone the three most geographically relevant states possessing nuclear weapons are India, Israel and Pakistan. Opening an NSA Protocol to these states would involve recognising their nuclear weapon status, which NPT parties have so far been reluctant to do. Including Israel would run counter to the call for that state to join a Middle East Zone Free of WMD and to give up all such weapons.

Options include opening the Protocol to:

1. China, France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom;
2. The above plus India, Israel and Pakistan;
3. An open formulation “All states possessing nuclear weapons”.

Radioactive Waste Dumping

Most NWFZ treaties include a ban on the dumping of radioactive waste.

This is more an environmental than an arms control issue although it has gained relevance given current fears of terrorist use of such substances.

Physical Protection / Access to WMD by Non-state actors

A reference to the **Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials** is included in recent NWFZ treaties. This might be expanded to include measures for protection of dangerous pathogens and chemical substances. The relevant operative paragraphs of **U N Security Council Resolution 1540** would make an important addition to the scope of the Treaty.

Prohibition of Armed Attack on Nuclear Installations

This is included in the Treaty of Pelindaba.

It might be thought useful to extend this to include other installations containing dangerous substances. This could be achieved through reference to **Article 56 of Additional Protocol 1 (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949**.

Area coverage

Territorial waters only or including international waters?

Pelindaba is limited to 12 miles.

Tlatelolco, Raratonga and Bangkok include large ocean areas.

There could be logic in including all the surface of the Gulf. This would need a definition of the sea boundary of the Zone at the Indian Ocean end.



Organisational Model

It will be necessary to consider which organisational model would be most convenient, preferably not involving the creation of new bureaucratic structures.

Perhaps the Secretariat of the Gulf Cooperation Council could service the treaty.

Future expansion

Is it intended to limit the Zone to the 9 states originally proposed until the area is absorbed in a future MEZFWMD; or would other (contiguous) states of the Middle East be encouraged to join the Gulf zone when they felt able, thus converting it eventually into the desired MEZFWMD?

Entry into force

Should all 9 states ratify for entry into force; or could the treaty enter into force for those who have ratified it when a smaller target is reached?

Conclusion

The concept of a Gulf Zone Free of Weapons of Mass destruction seems a valuable one, providing it can indeed be achieved without diminishing the importance of the wider call for a zone including the whole of the Middle East including Israel. In the interim it could provide valuable security benefits for the nine states proposed as members. Its precise content must be a matter for those states to negotiate, taking due account of the concerns of their neighbours and the wider community.



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In 1989 he represented the UK on the Chemical Weapons ad-hoc committee, working group on administrative and legal issues, and in 1993 took leave from the UK Diplomatic Service to serve as Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague (1993-7).



NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE: A DANGEROUS ANACHRONISM

Prof. Dr. Harald MÜLLER, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, Germany

A brief history of NATO's nuclear posture

- NATO started with tactical nuclear weapons in order to counter a perceived Soviet superiority, resigning to the Alliance's lack of capability and will to match Soviet conventional forces
- Massive retaliation, motivating the deployment of seven thousand nuclear weapons of a great variety (from man-portable landmines to intermediate-range missiles) was the doctrine in the era of a US monopoly in strategic delivery
- Flexible response, re-emphasizing conventional defence, and a carefully designed escalation ladder, reacted to the SU's achieving parity.
- Flexible response needed two opposite interpretations in order to satisfy alliance needs: The US believed in the possibility of a „firewall“ between conventional and nuclear war, the Europeans indulged in the faith in a „seamless web“ from the first shot to intercontinental Armageddon.
- In the eighties, the deployment of highly precise and longer-range INF augured a change in doctrine to counterforce/counterleadership, but the development stopped with the INF Treaty.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO de-emphasized nuclear weapons, but kept the „powder dry“

- In 1991, President Bush took the initiative to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe to a few hundred, restricted to gravity bombs. Pres. Gorbachow reciprocated, though the Soviet tactical nuclear arsenal remained larger.
- NATO's doctrine spoke of nuclear use as a „very remote“ possibility, but
 - Continued to reserve the option of first use
 - Retained nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states
 - Preserved the role of the air forces of these allies in the potential delivery of nuclear weapons to target
- With NATO enlargement, the Alliance declared it had no plans, intentions, or need to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of the new allies, but reserved the option to do so under changed circumstances.
- All attempts by individual member states (Canada and Germany) to change doctrine to no-first use or to discuss the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to the US were watered down, rebuffed, or silenced.

NATO's nuclear allies have developed policies that are illegal, damaging, self-serving, and irresponsible

- The US has conventionalised nuclear weapons. While rhetorically praising „de-emphasis“, nuclear weapons are part and parcel of the „prompt global strike“ complex. The doctrine has eliminated the difference between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. NW from Europe could theoretically be employed in an Iranian contingency.
- Employment options are against CW and BW use or facilities, to change a dis-favourable situation on the battle field, bring war to a prompt end, ensure the success of a multilateral operation.
- The French President has declared the „approvisionnement des matériaux stratégiques“ as within the „intérêts vitaux“ that come under the nuclear umbrella. In other words: „If you don't supply your oil for my limousine, I'll nuke you“
- The negative security guarantees given in the NPT and NWFZ contexts are thereby thrown out of the window.
- The said employment options are strictly illegal under the ICJ's Advisory Opinion which ruled the use of nuclear weapons out in all contingencies where the survival of a state was not at stake.

The impact on the NP regime is strictly negative

- The United States and France are building large new facilities for the development of nuclear warheads without full scale testing.
- Mr. Blair has justified the replacement of the Trident system with a successor nuclear system with the „uncertain future“
- Since it is the basis attribute for the future to be uncertain (otherwise it would be called the past), and since this condition applies to all human beings, and not only to Her Majesty's subjects, Mr. Blair's reasoning is a kind invitation to 187 non-nuclear weapon states to go nuclear.
- The same applies to NATO's doctrine: When the most powerful military alliance in history, accounting for about 70% of the world's military expenditures, can renounce neither nuclear weapons nor first use, why should states in much more precarious security situations do so?



- The nuclear weapon states, led by the US, have breached their Art. VI obligations under the NPT, as specified in 1995 and 2000
- US doctrine and the renunciation of the ABM Treaty has stimulated a new arms race that is in full swing.
- With the P-5 not abiding by their obligations, the NPT is eroding.

NATO's non-nuclear weapon states share the blame because of their spineless sheepishness

- NATO's non-nuclear weapon states harbour – potentially – the greatest influence on their nuclear armed allies
- But they make almost no use of it. When they rebel, they give in too quickly. And most of the time they fail to support those rebelling.
- With that behaviour, they lend legitimacy to the behaviour and policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
- As a consequence, the West is seen as a „bloc“, resentment elsewhere is strengthened, and chances for dialogue are missed
- Therefore, the Western non-nuclear weapons states have to share the blame for the erosion of the NPT because of the breach of Art. VI.

There are several channels through which these polices take some influence on the Middle East

- The policies of NATO's nuclear weapon states may pose a direct threat to countries in the Middle East (the US against Iran and Syria)
- Nuclear weapons as status symbols, as cultivated by NATO's NWS are not without consequences on status-conscious countries in the region (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Saudi-Arabia)
- The refusal to give up the first use option suggests a fundamental utility of nuclear weapons for security
- The devaluation of negative security guarantees annoys in particular the most important Arab country, Egypt
- The erosion of the NP regime emerging from the violation of Art. VI obligations lowers the value of the Treaty as normative barrier

Conclusions

- The NP regime may be on the way to irreversible erosion
- If the trend is continued, a world with 30 nuclear weapon states within 20 years is a realistic possibility
- Among the most important instruments to prevent this development is a decisive turn towards nuclear disarmament
- This concerns NATO's three nuclear weapon states and, as a consequence, alliance strategy and posture
- NATO's non-nuclear weapon states are in the best position to take a stand. Rather than crawling below the table or singing praise for the obsolete „umbrella“ they should press their allies to reverse course and to proceed with disarmament
- The comprehensive test ban, the FMCT, a no-first use doctrine, the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and their inclusion into legally binding disarmament instruments are priority courses on the disarmament menu.



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Since 1986, he served at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt first as project director and then as research director. 1996 he was appointed Director of PRIF. 1995 and 2000 he was a member of the German delegation to Review Conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since 1999, he served on the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2004 as its Chairman and again in 2005 as a member in the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. 2004/2005 he was nominated member of the Expert Group on Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.



SWITZERLAND AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: VIEWS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

**Statement by Andreas FRIEDRICH, Minister, Head Arms Control and Disarmament Section, Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland (Summary by Dr. A. Nidecker)**

History and Principles

Like many other countries, CH up to the sixties considered acquiring WMD to ensure our own defence. However, in the light of lack of technology, limited financial and human resources and the international context, opposition grew and all plans and studies were abandoned once and for all with the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation (NPT) in 1977. CH now being fully in tune with the great majority of all other nations is in favor of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given our limited possibilities to directly influence security developments abroad, CH attaches great importance to protection based on international law, adhering to all relevant treaties and being member of all relevant organisations and institutions. CH supports all multilateral efforts for disarmament and arms control which aim at concrete results. Regardless of the specific substance of the various agreements, CH believes that these agreements should be universal, non-discriminating, verifiable and legally binding.

CH and the NPT – 9 Points

The NPT is the only legally binding instrument of global scope aiming at the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It remains in this respect – despite its weaknesses – an essential tool for international peace and stability.

- 1) The NPT was negotiated in Geneva and the majority of the review conferences took place in Geneva. The 2007 session of Preparatory Committee is again to be held in Geneva.
- 2) Despite this geographical link, CH at first was reluctant to ratify the NPT. CH insisted on clarification of one of its clauses (article III.2), since implications for our industry was not evident. Clarification was made in a special committee of nuclear exporters, chaired by and named after Swiss professor Claude Zangger.
- 3) Re the extension of the NPT in 1995, CH played a solo role. Contrary to most other Western countries, CH was hesitant to join the consensus for an indefinite extension of NPT. CH was concerned that an indefinite extension would deprive the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) of the last leverage they had on the Nuclear weapon states (NWS). CH finally accepted indefinite extension, but since then CH has unambiguously and repeatedly stated that indefinite extension of the NPT should in no way be interpreted as an indefinite extension of the status quo, in particular as far as the prerogatives of the five NWS under the NPT are concerned.
- 4) CH has pointed out on numerous occasions that the present NPT regime is based on two compromises: The first compromise, in 1967, was the renunciation of nuclear weapons (NW) by States which did not at that time possess NW, in exchange for a commitment by the NWS that they would pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith. Parallel to this, every State Party obtained the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy. The second compromise was made in 1995, when the States Parties decided to extend indefinitely the NPT in exchange notably for the adoption of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, which re-affirmed the commitment of NWS to bring about nuclear disarmament. These “Principles and Objectives” were re-affirmed at the 2000 Review Conference, in the final document which contained “Thirteen Steps” to bring about progressive nuclear disarmament in accordance with NPT Art. VI. CH therefore keeps insisting that the totality of the engagements contained in the NPT itself and in the final documents of 1995 and 2000 should be respected.
- 5) The NPT is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars (namely non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy). The relationship between these pillars has been the object of some debate. In this debate, CH insists that the strong emphasis that has been placed in recent years by some players on the non-proliferation aspect must not lead to the neglect of the two other pillars of the NPT. It is our view that the overwhelming majority of the NNWS has fully respected their commitments, and that the problems of our time are due to the NWS and to a very small number of other States only.
- 6) CH believes that in order to be credible bilateral or multilateral disarmament measures must be transparent, irreversible and verifiable.



7) CH regrets the decision by certain NWS to grant funds for the development of new NW. In CH view such decisions are contrary to the spirit of article VI of the NPT. They reduce the chances of nuclear disarmament in the near future and add new importance and attractiveness to NW for other States, who might consider their acquisition.

8) Recent initiative for nuclear cooperation between India and the United States raises fundamental questions about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation system based on the NPT. This deal will have to be approved later this year by the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). CH was among the first NSG members to formulate serious concerns about the implications of the proposed US-India deal.

9) CH strongly insists on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy but also on the strict application of all the Treaty provisions. As more and more States are seeking access to nuclear energy, the risk of future proliferation is increased. Solutions must therefore be found to reconcile peaceful uses and non-proliferation. A fair balance between regulations to ensure the prevention of abuses and the risk of new and unjustified discrimination has to be found.

CTBT

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another pillar in the non-proliferation and disarmament framework. Its entry into force is more urgent today than ever. CH signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1999. Thanks to support orchestrated by IPPNW, we were able to fund since 1988 the participation of a Swiss seismic expert in the Geneva based Group of Scientific Experts which devised the seismic monitoring system for the future CTBT. The Swiss Seismological Service at the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich was given a mandate to manage a seismic measurement station, linked to the international monitoring network, to verify that no State carries out nuclear tests. In October 2003, the Davos seismic station was inaugurated and represents a tangible Swiss contribution to the non-proliferation infrastructure.

FMCT

The next treaty to be negotiated is clearly a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). CH has for a long time been in favour of the conclusion of a FMCT. Our delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) last year submitted a paper by B. Pellaud on "A pragmatic approach to FMCT verification". The paper suggested a realistic approach to verification and has triggered a lively discussion in the CD. There is now new hope in Geneva that FMCT negotiations could start in a few weeks.

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZ ME)

The establishment of a NWFZ ME has been on the agenda of the UN General Assembly since 1974, and after becoming a member of the UN, CH has every year joined the consensus on the pertinent resolutions. In the same spirit, we have regularly supported the resolution entitled "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East" in the IAEA General Conference. Unfortunately, the implementation of a NWFZ ME faces difficulties. The issue is linked with the Middle East peace process and with the supposed presence of other WMD in the region.

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

The Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia was signed by the 5 Central Asian States last September 2006 in Semipalatinsk. However, its protocols have not yet been signed by the 5 NWS. We are aware and proud that Dr. A. Muhl, a former president of IPPNW Switzerland, has for several years played an active role in promoting the idea of such a central Asian zone. CH voted for the resolution on the "Establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia" at the UN General Assembly last year. The resolution was adopted by 128 yes, and 36 abstentions, against the votes of the U.S., France and the U.K. In a common statement after the vote CH and a number of other nations regarded the signing of that treaty as an effort to strengthen peace and stability in the region as well as a contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They noted that such a zone would be the first regional NWFZ in the northern hemisphere and would encompass an area where previously NW existed.

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe (NWFZ E)?

The CH administration is aware of ideas, supported by IPPNW, to create a NWFZ E, with CH as member. In 1999, in a reply to a parliamentary motion the Swiss government explained, why it was not ready to launch such an initiative at the moment. It pointed out that, by its ratification of the NPT, CH had already formally renounced NW, and that our legislation prohibits the acquisition, development, storage and transit of NW. More importantly, a NWFZ E is unrealistic as long as the military doctrines of NATO and Russia do not exclude the use and stationing of NW in Europe.



Security Assurances

Linked to the question of NWFZ is the issue of Negative Security Assurances. They are provided by NWS to NNWS and NPT members. But in the view of CH they remain insufficient because they are for the most part accompanied by reservations. Whether or not they belong to a NWFZ, States parties which do not have NW have a legitimate right to security assurances against the use or the threat of use of NW. CH has repeatedly requested that, in accordance with one of the recommendations in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, a legally binding multilateral instrument should be negotiated.

Two crisis regions, Korea (DPRK) and Iran

DPRK It has been constant view of CH that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved by peaceful means, in the framework of the so-called “Six Party Talks”. CH is ready to offer assistance to the Parties involved. On several occasions, we called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to adhere once again to the NPT. The situation has evolved in recent weeks in a more positive way, since there is now a roadmap for the implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement. CH encourages the States concerned to proceed with the “initial actions for the implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement” and hopes that this agreement will be the DPRK’s first step towards honoring its obligations under the NPT. CH also welcomes the declaration of the DPRK to be willing to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility.

Iran The nuclear crisis in Iran continues to pose serious challenges to international peace and security. We believe that a diplomatic, peaceful solution is both preferable and more likely to prevent Iran from acquiring NW. There is no dispute about Iran’s right to peaceful uses under the NPT. The issue at stake is Iran’s failure to build the necessary confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its program, and the fact that the IAEA is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program. The current situation is not encouraging. There is a lack of co-operation between Iran and the IAEA. CH shares the concerns over Iran’s nuclear program expressed by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Since Iran has not abided by the provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1696 and 1737, it might become the object of additional sanctions. There is a risk of a military escalation. CH is willing to contribute to a peaceful solution and have declared our readiness to convene an international conference in CH between Iran and the P5 and Germany.

Conclusion

CH has always had strong and original views on the relationship between non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a non-member of the European Union and of NATO, CH tends to be more outspoken than some of our neighbours. The complete elimination of all NW clearly remains goal of CH. At the same time, CH has always advocated a pragmatic and realistic approach to nuclear disarmament, and insists on the need for respect by all States parties of all of their obligations arising from the NPT. NW are the most dangerous and potentially most devastating devices on this planet. Some States are playing with matches. We should not let them do so. But by the same token those who already have the matches should throw them away too.



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THE NPT: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS AND PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Dr. Bruno PELLAUD¹, President SVA, Nuklearforum, Switzerland

On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. His presentation, known as the „Atoms for Peace“ speech, was bold, broad, and visionary. Eisenhower highlighted the dangers associated with the further spread of nuclear weapons, but he also pointed to the peaceful opportunities. Although Eisenhower’s specific proposal for an international civilian use of fissile material was never implemented, his broader themes gave impetus to agreements such as the **“Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)”** and to institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some believe that Eisenhower’s basic concepts remain sound and provide a foundation for the future. Others believe that they were never sound and encouraged a dangerous proliferation of nuclear technology around the world. Yet, his successor, President J. F. Kennedy, was wrong when he predicted in 1963 that there would be 20-25 weapons States by the end of the century. International treaties and, confidently, the work of the “International Atomic Energy Agency” have made a difference.

Nuclear in the broader context of weapons of mass destruction

At this point, a brief sideway look at the other two “weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” is worthwhile, to better understand the broader issues of the civilian-military duality of these technologies, and to draw lessons for the NPT from other WMD treaties and verification systems, especially the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Nuclear weapons arrived on the scene in 1945 at a time when other “scientific weapons” of massive impact had already been extensively used, raising anew the issue of technology applied to both civilian and military purposes, pitting against each other those who want to limit the risks by constraining and even forbidding the civilian applications and those who want to do mirror-like only for the military applications. This is an essential debate for all three forms of WMD, since each of them has over the last century caused several hundred thousand victims.

Chemical weapons had been considered well before the German army let chlorine gas drift towards allied troops in Ypres in April 1915. The chemists went on developing more sophisticated battlefield chemical weapons that were fortunately not used during WW II. Ultimately in the early nineties, the world community agreed on a non-discriminatory Chemical Weapons Convention that covers the whole spectrum of development, possession and use. This convention imposes acceptable constraints on the scientific and industrial development of chemistry. Biological weapons are the oldest and most difficult to cope with in terms of arms control. There have been punctual uses in earlier centuries. During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II, they became weapons of mass destruction when Japanese army physicians applied them systematically to Chinese soldiers and civilians, causing numerous and large-scale plague and cholera outbreaks.

The WMD Commission chaired by the former IAEA Director General Hans Blix notes: *“There are significant differences in the use, effects, legal status and strategic importance of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Nuclear weapons continue to pose the most dramatic threats. Some experts regard the differences as so significant that they will not lump the three types of weapons together under the single term of WMD. Nevertheless, as weapons of terror all three categories fall under the same stigma, which makes it logical to deal with them as a group².”*

Whether the physicists of the Manhattan Project, the chemists of IG Farben or the physicians of Harbin and Nanjing, their work has thrown a shadow on the corresponding peaceful activities; they have forced the international community to deal seriously with WMD³. Indeed, an extensive net of treaties has been put in place to circumscribe the risks associated with the three categories of WMD. Most advanced are the chemical weapons for which clear and consistent general principles have been adopted, topped with a credible verification system in place. The same could apply to biological weapons, even though verification is here much more difficult. These systems are good, but the development of chemical science and industry as well as the rapid expansion in biotechnology and life sciences create opportunities for important peaceful uses, but also for the production of chemical weapons and dreadful uses of viruses and bacteria as weapons.

Nuclear needs fixing - to bring the NPT closer to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to make it stronger. A sophisticated verification system is in place for the “have-nots”, but imposes no constraints on declared weapons States. The 1968 NPT succeeded in attracting a vast membership - in spite of the discriminatory acceptance of the first wave of



five nuclear-weapon states. Thirty-seven years after the entry into force of the NPT, the five nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty have failed in their duty to achieve disarmament through negotiation.

The IAEA safeguards verification system, created to verify that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses, proved inadequate to uncover the Iraqi and Libyan violations of the NPT. Iran failed for many years in its duty to declare important nuclear activities. Radioactive substances used in medicine, research and industry might be acquired by terrorists and be used in “dirty bombs” – devices that disperse radioactive material to contaminate target areas or to provoke terror⁴.

Civilian nuclear power

The basic historical “bargain” for non-nuclear weapons States of “*non-proliferation commitment vs. legitimate peaceful use*” was embedded in the 1953 Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech, in the IAEA Statute and in the NPT. All civilian activities under IAEA safeguards are in fact legal. Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which had earlier provided the basis for the foundation of the IAEA, is embodied in Article IV of the NPT, which stipulates that nothing shall be interpreted as affecting the “*inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination...*”.

In the company of people who think that biological and chemical research and development do contribute to human welfare - in spite of the looming proliferation risks – the proponents of nuclear energy maintain that it has a role to play in the production of electricity. In a nutshell, why is it so?

1. The megacities of the world demand large amounts of electricity. The one billion Chinese of the coastal area and the high population densities of Continental Europe call for much electricity to run their industries competitively. These regions require *centralised* and *concentrated* forms of electricity production, such as fossil, nuclear, hydropower and wind energy. On the other hand, *decentralised* forms are better suited for other vast regions of the world. Nuclear and renewables are thus complementary.
2. From small Finland to large America, governments and utilities seek ways to render their electricity base less dependent on fossil energy; this is the main drive towards renewables and nuclear, not so much the carbon-free nature of these energies per se. For sure, uranium needs to be imported, but from America, Australia and Canada, not Russia, Algeria or the Middle East. With uranium accounting for only some 5% of the cost of a nuclear kilowatt-hour, there is flexibility in terms of uranium price to tap large uranium reserves over several hundred years.
3. Even with these advantages, nuclear power will be an option only for developed economies, not for the developing world, since nuclear is too demanding in terms of infrastructure and national capabilities. In a speech delivered early January 2007, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, warned countries considering the possibility of pursuing domestic nuclear power programmes – such as Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria – that it was not a decision to be taken lightly. “*As a sophisticated technology, nuclear power requires a correspondingly sophisticated infrastructure ... from industrial infrastructure such as manufacturing facilities, to complex legal and regulatory frameworks, to expanded institutional measures to ensure safety and security, to the necessary human and financial resources.*”
4. The energy debate is nowadays dominated by the issue of “combustion wastes”, be it the carbon dioxide from fossil fuel or the radioactive residues from nuclear power. As far as carbon dioxide, the ElBaradei warning shows that nuclear will not be a solution to climate changes worldwide; the scale of the problem as assessed today is just too large, a scale that will require a much broader and diversified approach in terms of energy conservation and production. The nuclear contribution will nonetheless remain very significant locally, to the point that many countries will not fulfil their commitment under the Kyoto Protocol *without it*: Switzerland, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Hungary, France and Germany, to name a few.
5. Fossil fuel leaves a massive heritage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, an inventory that would remain present for some 1000 years in the air and the seawater, according to the recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Nuclear power has its own Achilles heritage, the long-lived combustion products. The difference is that these radioactive products are retained, encapsulated and buried deep underground, instead of being irreversibly dispersed in the atmosphere. Safely stored in a geological repository,



they will decay below the surrounding natural radiation level within 1000 to 10⁰⁰⁰ years, that is not much longer than carbon dioxide. However, this is done according to a fundamentally new and more responsible philosophy of waste disposal: *Concentration outside the biosphere, instead of dilution into the biosphere*. Such underground repositories are under construction in Finland, close to construction in Sweden and in the United States of America, and planned in Switzerland after the current political phase of site selection. These efforts – in all the countries mentioned – will be financed by the current generations, since a fee is already collected now, as part of the current price of nuclear electricity, with the funds accumulated beyond the reach of plant operators. Ironically, to secure its future, the coal industry is now contemplating a similar sequestration strategy for its carbon-dioxide, with retention after combustion and deep burial underground in solid form. One can say that another new philosophy is emerging, *a philosophy of underground recycling outside the biosphere*: from underground coal to underground solidified carbon-dioxide, from underground uranium to underground vitrified radioactive waste.

As the (antinuclear) Swiss Minister of Energy, Moritz Leuenberger, likes to point out, “*whether one supports or opposes the construction of nuclear plants, it is irresponsible to fight against the safe disposal of radioactive waste*”. Incidentally, one should not forget that around 20 % of the radioactive waste generated come from medical, research and other industrial applications. Therefore, the job must be done anyhow.

WMD and science, Siamese twins? In essence, yes, since scientific and technical progress feeds into promising civilian undertakings as well as into dubious military laboratories. Nevertheless, most WMD programmes were established without a civilian infrastructure in place; military scientists went directly to the weapons in the secret of their laboratories. As far as nuclear is concerned, most weapons programmes, successful or embryonic, were done without civilian nuclear power plants in operation. Nevertheless, the question remains: “How thin is the borderline between civilian and military activities?”. The thinnest borderline is probably with the chemical weapons, because of the large scale chemical activities in the world and the relative ease there is to acquire some of the precursors. One should not forget that a simple fertiliser manufacturing plant can be turned into a chemical weapons factory in a few days. Next comes the biological side, with small-scale laboratory experiments that can be easily concealed, even though the basic ingredients have become much more difficult to buy. As to nuclear, the borderline is practically nonexistent in countries that operate nuclear plants *only*, without having at hand enrichment and reprocessing facilities. In the latter cases, this is where the IAEA verification remains important and needs to remain up to the task.

Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation

With hot spots like Iraq, North Korea, Iran, what can be said about the solidity of the non-proliferation regime? The NPT gained much strength with the permanent extension of its validity in 1995. But, at the same time, there has been a lack of discipline in enforcing it and in deciding about the required sanctions, especially in the Security Council. Three factors seem to play a role in the current weak political handling of NPT violations, a weakness particularly severe in the case of North Korea.

The first is the lack of an “NPT Board of Trustees” dedicated to the cause of non-proliferation. The absence of an implementing authority leaves the Treaty parties without an effective, representative voice to address incidents or suspicions, withdrawals or non-compliance. The Security Council is supposed to play that role. Going to the Security Council has not always helped; non-compliance matters get second priority in the pattern of power politics. This lack of determination weakens the NPT. The strong members of the Council protect their sphere, their friends, rather than promoting non-proliferation. For example, China was for a long time reluctant to exercise influence over North Korea in the current crisis.

Short of a dedicated NPT Board, the impasse could be resolved through the adoption of guidelines for the handling of non-proliferation issues in the Security Council, in particular among the five weapon States. These guidelines could for example clarify legal interpretations, they could specify actions to be undertaken in case of non-compliance, they could allocate responsibilities within the Council for dealing with some issues, etc. Political compromises would of course always prevail, but a few guidelines would help bring some order in the process. At any rate, the strengthening of compliance mechanisms *above* the IAEA would do a lot for the credibility of IAEA safeguards, for their effectiveness in terms of detection and deterrence.

Second the “Board of Governors of the IAEA”. The adoption of guidelines for the handling of non-compliance would also help, rather than leaving such issues to political expediency. The non-declaration of sensitive nuclear materials – as in the case of Iran for the materials acquired from China in the early nineties – should trigger an immediate sanction in the



Board, for example the cancellation of all technical assistance, even for medical applications. These “known-in-advance” mechanisms should be progressive enough to act as effective deterrents in the form of appropriate measures to handle various degrees of violations.

The third factor is related to a lack of political commitment shown by too many countries towards agreements that have been negotiated. Too many non-nuclear weapons States have not yet brought into implementation the Additional Protocol 10 years after its adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors. Of course, there are numerous excuses for doing so: for Middle East countries, the undeclared Israeli nuclear armament. The behaviour of large Western countries claiming the “moral high ground” on every opportunity is another reason. Over the last 20 years a number of significant non-proliferation and disarmament treaties have been concluded. For failing to ratify these treaties, for claiming a right to stand aside and aloof, the United States has for the time being lost the credibility and the authority to define the future of international WMD agreements. The other nuclear weapons States are cowardly hiding in the American shadow.

To secure peace, to protect the world from nuclear weapons, there is more than ever the need to strengthen international verification arrangements. **International solutions** should remain the preferred approach. The international community should maintain the momentum, with the United Nations as the focal point. When the 2003 Iraq war broke up, some media announced prematurely the end of the UN – for having dared to challenge the American assertions on Iraq’s WMD. What a non-sense! The UN “body and soul” has survived with flying colours. Hans Blix has demonstrated what good organisation, intelligence, fairness and determination can do under the UN flag. On the nuclear file of Iraq, the IAEA has kept a steady course, competent, consistent and unimpressed by shifting political winds, a stance that brought it the Nobel Peace Prize.

The dual role of the IAEA

The main functions of the IAEA are to encourage and assist research, development and practical applications of nuclear energy for peaceful use; assist Members-States to maintain high standards of safety in so doing, establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activities are not used to further any military purpose (at the request of Members-States or under international treaties, foremost the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). The promotional technical assistance from the IAEA covers mostly nonenergy applications in medicine, agriculture, research and industry, as seen below in the pie showing the 2005 repartition. The balance of activities deals with the establishment and maintenance of standards – such as transportation guidelines for radioactive sources used in research and medicine – and with the formulation of minimum safety standards for nuclear power related programmes. Some people question this dual mission spelled out in the Statute of the IAEA. Yet, is this duality a genuine problem, the nuclearfriendly mission and the role of nuclear police officer?

For 2005, the Norwegian Nobel Committee decided that the Nobel Peace Prize should be shared, in two equal parts, between the IAEA as an organisation and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, for their efforts *“to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way”*. The Committee added: *“At a time when disarmament efforts appear deadlocked ... and when nuclear power again appears to be playing an increasingly significant role, IAEA’s work is of incalculable importance.”*

The IAEA does not promote nuclear power as such; as quoted above from ElBaradei’s speech in Algiers, it would rather discourage weak countries to walk down that road; however, it does promote safety standards and personnel qualifications for nuclear plant operations. In the sixties and seventies under the guidance of a physicist as Director General, it is true: the IAEA agenda was dominated by the development of nuclear power. Safeguards were a very marginal activity. The focus shifted gradually in the seventies with the new verification responsibilities that the IAEA took over under the NPT. Since the Gulf war of 1991, the verification mandate dominates the IAEA agenda. The drive to promote proper nonproliferation policies and high standards of integrity and professionalism on the verification side of the house dictates the decisions of the Director General, nothing else.

For the near term, under the prevailing international arrangements, a split of the IAEA mission into a “promotion” and a “verification” entity does not make sense. The verification side benefits from the nuclear knowhow available in-house, in one place, a great advantage for the two functions. The safeguards inspectors take advantage of the technical expertise and available information from other staff members, while the others benefit from the authoritative position of the IAEA on the non-proliferation scene to promote non-mandatory safety and security standards in other nuclear undertakings. Later, probably much later, one could nevertheless envisage a re-grouping around the concept of “nuclear verification know-how” into a single *“International Nuclear Verification Agency”* of the three areas of nuclear verification:



1) the current IAEA safeguards mandate, 2) the current CTBTO (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) mandate and 3) a future agency verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). To begin with, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva needs to go down to work on such a FMCT.

How good are IAEA safeguards?

The discoveries in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War made it clear that the then existing IAEA verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and its limited rights of access to information and sites, was not adequate for the IAEA to provide comprehensive peaceful use assurances. Starting in 1995, the IAEA introduced a number of additional technical tools to strengthen its verification activities, such as environmental sampling and satellite imagery.

Since then, IAEA nuclear inspectors have a broad range of high-tech tools at their disposal. They collect dust, liquid and soil samples on various sites for fuller analysis in laboratories. Analysis can determine “nuclear fingerprints” and reveal indicators of past and current activities. Images obtained by commercial satellite imaging sensors can now greatly help inspectors track activities. In 1997, the IAEA introduced the Additional Protocol to strengthen its hand even more. What is the **Additional Protocol** (to safeguards agreements)? The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority.

In the light of the Iranian case, some critics have questioned the ability of the IAEA to detect clandestine programmes, even with an Additional Protocol in place. The IAEA safeguards system - as strengthened in the nineties - is too often grossly underestimated in assessing the role and efficacy of IAEA safeguards, in Iran and elsewhere.

How to strengthen the NPT and the IAEA?

Beyond long-standing issues such as universality, the nuclear non-proliferation debate is driven by new challenges to the existing non-proliferation regime, inter alia: the discovery of undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS); the existence of clandestine supply networks for the acquisition of nuclear technology; and the risk of “breakout” from the NPT by States within the regime. Several proposals have been put forward for ensuring that the nuclear non-proliferation regime maintains its authority, effectiveness and credibility in the face of these very challenges. Some of these proposals call for the **denial of sensitive technology** to NNWS not already possessing such facilities, with even the creation of a monopolistic “Nuclear Weapons States cartel”. This is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Article IV of the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapon States reject additional restrictions on their development of peaceful nuclear technology *without equivalent progress on disarmament*. Another proposal is for **multilateral approaches** to the operation of those parts of the nuclear fuel cycle considered to be of the greatest sensitivity from the point of view of proliferation risk. Other proposals have focused on the **strengthening and effective application of the IAEA’s safeguards system**.

The non-nuclear weapons States will refuse in their overwhelming majority modifications or reinterpretations of the NPT that will imply an outright denial of technology. The following proposals reflect a number of steps that could possibly materialise in the near future - with a proper mobilisation of the non-proliferation community:

1. Strengthen the IAEA by making the Additional Protocol universal

New IAEA Board resolutions, supported by a corresponding Security Council resolution, should remind all government to sign and ratify the Additional Protection. The same point should be made repeatedly in the framework of bilateral or multilateral governmental relationships. In the Middle East, the countries of the region should also sign, thereby strengthening their own hand with respect to Israel, rather than demanding a preliminary clarification of Israel’s nuclear status. Non-governmental organisations should use their influence to push for a universal adoption of the Additional Protocol, within or without efforts to establish Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.

2. Set up rules and guidelines for the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council

The Board of Governors is the executive power of the IAEA. Its actions in cases of non-compliance with safeguards commitments should be predictable, and not subject to the vagaries of political decision-makings. The Board should agree on a list of violations with appropriate measures depending on the severity of non-compliance (beyond the mere “anomalies”, which can be settled by the IAEA Secretariat). Only the most severe violations would be reported to the UN Security Council. The Security Council itself should also have better internal guidelines for handling violations of WMD treaties.

3. Work towards a successful 2010 NPT Review conference

The 2005 Review Conference was a major failure. Non-nuclear weapons States should get together before 2010 and



develop a strategy of their own to counter the inertia and egocentric proposals of the weapons States: e.g.

- Determination that the Additional Protocol is a must for NPT members;
- Propose the constitution of an NPT Board (not necessarily a permanent secretariat);
- Get confirmation of earlier commitments by nuclear weapons States (1995, 2000);
- As done in the past for “peaceful nuclear explosions”, reinterpretation of certain stipulations, such as the right of withdrawal from the treaty;
- Set a new norm: the multilateralisation of sensitive fuel cycle activities for existing and new facilities.

4. Take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament

It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations:

- New collective attempt in arsenal reductions;
- Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- Launch negotiations of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, if deadlocked, outside the Geneva Conference for Disarmament;
- Work on a new, future universal NPT on the model of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The last words belong to the WMD Commission: “The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. ... Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed”

References:

1 Former Deputy director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Head of its Department of Safeguards, 1993-1999 – Icoigne, Switzerland – bruno@pellaud.com

2 Hans Blix, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, biological, and Chemical Arms”, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006.

3 Hans Blix, *ibid*

4 “Dirty bombs” are not to be considered as weapons of mass destruction; still, this is a serious matter of public health. Studies show that only seven isotopes are of concern in terms of terrorist utilisation. Moreover, the number of corresponding exporting countries is limited to six. Better security worldwide could possibly be achieved with exporting countries getting together to contractually impose uniform conditions of use, security standards, and recovery of old sources.



Bruno Pellaud, president of the Swiss Nuclear Forum, The Swiss Nuclear Forum is the main nuclear association of the country – with private members and collective members from industry, from the electrical utilities, from research organisations and from government offices.

Bruno Pellaud studied at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich where he received a M.S. in Nuclear Physics, at the University of Lausanne where he got a M.A. in Economics and at New York University where he earned a PhD in Nuclear Engineering. In the sixties and seventies, he worked in research and in management in California and in Switzerland. In the eighties, he was Head of the Nuclear Department of a Swiss engineering company involved in the construction of a large US-designed nuclear power plant in Switzerland.

In 1993, Bruno Pellaud became Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and Head of its Department of Safeguards – focusing on the strengthening of the safeguards system, and dealing with the North-Korean and Iranian issues. Back in Switzerland since 1999, he is President of the Swiss Nuclear Forum, the main nuclear association of the country, as well as nuclear consultant and occasional adviser on nuclear security and non-proliferation matters to the Swiss Government and to the IAEA.



MUTUAL DISTRUST AND THREATS: IS THERE A CHANCE FOR DIALOGUE?

**Dr. Margret Johannsen, Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Safety Policy
at the University of Hamburg, Germany** (Summary by Dr. Günter Baitsch)

What are we dealing with, when we deal with distrusts and threats? Distrust is a subjective category; threat seems to be an objective one. However, strictly speaking we can only talk about threat perceptions. They are usually based on knowledge, such as information on weapon inventories, strategic doctrines and war games, and on experience with war, border conflicts, civil strife, terrorism. Still, even if we base our hypotheses on future risks on real life, we still speculate because we deal not only with capabilities but also with intentions. The nuclear deterrence discourse during the time of the East-West-conflict has taught us that nuclear capabilities without assumed intentions are not considered a threat – this is the reason why the Federal Republic of Germany did not really worry about the nuclear weapons of its French neighbour.

What makes us believe that a state seeks nuclear weapons because

- it is planning a nuclear strike against another state;
- it wants to be able to attack another state with conventional weapons and feel safe under the umbrella of its own nuclear weapons;
- it is interested in creating problems for another state by supporting liberation movements or terrorism without having to fear military retaliation?

Do we believe that the situation is dangerous because a government says something threatening and we think it is capable of carrying out this threat? Or because it does not say such things but we believe them anyway? Some heads of government talk a lot, some say little, some blunder, by mistake or deliberately – who knows for sure? Do we believe him (or her) because we know him or at least think so? Or because we believe that he is like us? Or do we refuse to believe him because he is so different from us? And because if he is so different he must be subjected to a different standard? And is a dialogue at all possible if the credibility of the other is assessed from a position of hegemony?

Uncertainty prevails when we reflect on motives and intentions related to the possession of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, even if we cannot be sure why certain states aspire to attain a nuclear status, we have to take the possible reasons seriously, evaluate and judge them without bias. Otherwise, we can forget about dialogue.

Talking about the demand side, we must of course take Israel's nuclear weapons into consideration. The majority of Western analysts assume that Israel considers nuclear weapons as „weapons of last resort“ in case the very existence of the Jewish state is at stake. In this sense, they constitute “existential deterrence”. Deterrence in a wider sense includes the function of convincing the Arab world that any attempt to undermine the survival of the Jewish state would be bound to fail, in order to make its Arab neighbours more amenable to a peace that accepts Israel as a legitimate state of the Middle East.

Moreover, its nuclear weapons are said to give the Israeli „client“ leverage against its US „patron“. In the case of a regional war their very existence could convince friendly nations that, in order to prevent Israel from employing its nuclear weapons, it should be receive advanced conventional weaponry.

Israel's nuclear weapons could also be seen as allowing Israel to hold on to occupied territory without having to fear another war with the Arab states. This is the view many Arab analysts take.

When turning to the possible motives of the nuclear have-nots to go nuclear we should bear two things in mind: First, they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Israel's nuclear status could be a reason for them to acquire a nuclear status, too. Some call it the “me too” argument, but sneering at it isn't exactly prudent. Secondly, any motive that might be seen as justifying Israel's nuclear option ought, as a matter of principle, not to be discounted as a possible motive for an Arab state or Iran to also develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Arguing otherwise would amount to a bias bordering on nuclear racism as more aggressive rhetoric might put it.

Putting speculation aside – I think it is safe to say that the Israeli nuclear monopoly is a major factor in the strategic calculations of the regional states. But this does not necessarily imply that every motive for going nuclear is caused by the Israeli nuclear option.



Nuclear weapons can create existential threats to other states. As such they can be used to deter war, for instance by

- o threatening to retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked with weapons of mass destruction;
- o threatening to escalate conventional war onto non-conventional levels if the enemy is superior in terms of conventional weapons;
- o threatening to employ nuclear weapons in case of a military intervention by external powers;

Creating existential threats can also serve other interests than deterring war such as

- o forcing the hand of allies or hegemonies in order to obtain valuable goods such as high-tech conventional weapons, energy, food etc., including also immaterial goods such as diplomatic relations, security guarantees and the like;
- o stimulating arms control;
- o increasing the state's status and influence in the region and in the international community;
- o increasing the country's prestige in the eyes of the populace and thereby boost the popularity of the regime.

Sometimes it is argued that the situation in the Middle East cannot be likened to the Cold War. One of the reasons given are profound doubts concerning the rationality of the power elites in the Middle East. For the question I am dealing with – Is there a chance for dialogue? – this is an important issue, since we encounter a bias here that suggests a double standard.

Two motives remain. They are sometimes condescendingly called “glitter effect”. This term applies to the motive of advancing a state's regional and global influence and increasing the regime's popularity. I remember a statement by a high ranking member of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority who likened the effect of an open declaration to “go nuclear” with Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in 1956. Can we safely say that these motives are oriental ones, that they are alien to the enlightened minds of the Americans, the British, the French, the Russians? Or the Chinese, for that matter? As long as there is war, weapons provide status. Nuclear weapons make a state different from all the other states except for the other seven nuclear states. The USA and Russia, in spite of substantial cuts into their inventories, hold firmly on to their nuclear status. In fact, they have far more nuclear weapons than might be deemed necessary for minimum deterrence purposes.

The two European nuclear weapon states France and Great Britain resemble them in this respect. The possession of nuclear weapons appears to enhance the role of the nuclear weapon states in the international community, and the apparent influence derived from a nuclear status – be it real or based on self-deception – will not be lost upon other states, neither in the Middle East nor elsewhere.

However, the territorial status quo in the Middle East is by no means a foundation on which peaceful coexistence can thrive. For decades, conflicting territorial claims and confrontational security thinking have prevailed in the Arab-Israeli security relations. The mutual threat perceptions are linked to worst case scenarios, in spite and because of the Middle East peace process which led to peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours Egypt and Jordan, but failed to produce results on the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese tracks.

In a climate of confrontation, it is difficult to convince a state that reaching for the ultimate weapon is not in its self-interest. There is a hidden nexus between the conflict regarding territory and self-determination on the one hand and the proliferation issue on the other hand. The link between the two are the profound feelings of insecurity and humiliation that are haunting the Middle East. And here of all regions are we witness to a battle of words which attunes public opinion worldwide to the possibility and legitimacy of preventive military operations – or “anticipatory defence” as the Orwellian phrase goes.

If dialogue is to be given a chance it is essential to tackle the issue of the existential insecurity in the Middle East. Any attempt to bring about a dialogue about the regional problems and crises is bound to fail if and when governments have reason to fear that they will be forcefully removed from power, if and when democratically elected governments do not get the chance to prove themselves, if and when international law is ignored and humanitarian law is violated on a large scale with impunity – in short: if and when the law of the strongest prevails.

We shouldn't fool ourselves. There is a perception in the Middle East that in the unresolved regional conflicts it is the law of the strongest that prevails. Fears of annihilation, ethnic cleansing, politicide are poisoning the political discourse and are supplying the energy for popular feelings of hatred and fear.



Therefore I would argue for a linkage in tackling these problems, i.e. for a comprehensive approach. It may be true that as long as existential threat perceptions prevail among important regional actors there will not be such thing as a nuclear free zone. At the same time, it would be faulty reasoning to conclude that first, the territorial conflicts must be settled, only then can we begin to seriously tackle the issue of a nuclear weapons free zone. Maybe the opposite is true. For it seems that the taboo concerning the employment of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict is eroding. Therefore it is urgent that negotiations are restarted instead of relying on containment, instead of hoping that the tactics of tit-for-tat can be pursued for ever. As we have recently seen in the Lebanese war, and also in the Gaza Strip: Such tactics may work for a while but never for ever. Because they are communication without words and as such entail a high risk of communicative failure.

Negotiations require conceding the other legitimacy as negotiating partner. If this happens, if a political process at long last replaces the so called low intensity conflict it is time to also launch talks about a nuclear weapons free zone. If there is reason to fear that the next regional war could be waged with weapons of mass destruction, then the settlement of the territorial conflicts that have been festering in the region for decades, is of utmost importance for the whole region and beyond. One might raise the objection that there is no territorial dispute between Israel and Iran. That's true. But we are all familiar with war by proxy, and proxies are not merely puppets on a string, moved at will by their patrons. Under certain conditions they might very well force their patrons' hand. The informal alliances in the Middle East connect the disputes in many ways. Therefore I argue for a comprehensive concept which puts all the issues on the table. Because time is not on the side of peace.



Margret Johannsen, studied in Berlin and Hamburg. She obtained her doctorate at the University of Hamburg and wrote her thesis on "American nuclear weapons in Europe". From 1977 to 1986, she was a secondary school instructor. From 1987 to 1997 she worked as delegated educator at IFSH and constructed its peace education service. Since 1997 she has belonged to IFSH as Senior Research Fellow. Margret Johannsen is lecturer in the postgraduate Master's program "Peace and Security Studies" at Hamburg University. Her research interests include the Middle East conflict, arms control, terrorism and peace education.

The Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) is an independent research institution at the University of Hamburg. It was established as a civil-law foundation in 1971 and is funded by the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg. IFSH is divided into three specialized research units, the Centre for European Peace and Security Studies (ZEUS), the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), and the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Disarmament, Arms Control, and Risk Technologies (IFAR³). The three research units combine to develop cooperative strategies for conflict resolution and prevention that pay special attention to the courses of action available to the German government.



PARLIAMENTARIANS AND A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE: NEW PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES

a briefing paper by the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament
and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – Austrian and Swiss Affiliates

Alyn WARE Global Coordinator, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, New Zealand

Introduction

Over the years there have been a number of proposals to establish nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) in Europe. In 1958, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki proposed that Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and West Germany reject the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory and join in a NWFZ. In 1963 Finland's President Kekkonen proposed a Nordic NWFZ comprising Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In the 1970s Romania proposed the denuclearization of the Balkans, and the Soviet Union appealed for creating a nuclear weapon zones in the Mediterranean. However, due to Cold War politics none of these were successful. In any case, the key focus on nuclear weapons constraint was on the stockpiles and policies of the US and USSR.

Following the end of the Cold War, the possibility of establishing a NWFZ in Europe opened up as former Warsaw Pact and Soviet States became free from any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons. In 1996, the Ukraine and Belarus, which under Soviet rule had hosted thousands of nuclear weapons, proposed a NWFZ for Central and Eastern Europe. This was opposed by some former Warsaw Pact countries that were aspiring to join NATO.

New reasons for a zone

There are a number of recent developments that are making the prospect of a NWFZ in Europe both more pressing and more possible. There is a growing threat of nuclear weapons use whether by an emerging nuclear State, and existing nuclear State or a terrorist organization. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists recently moved the hands of their *Doomsday Clock* to Five Minutes to Midnight reflecting this danger. Even former nuclear advocates such as Henry Kissinger (former US Secretary of State), George Shultz (former US Secretary of Defense) are now warning of the need for nuclear disarmament. NWFZs can reduce such nuclear threats and pave the way to nuclear disarmament.

A European NWFZ would provide security assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against such countries. It would also contribute to non-proliferation by a) enhancing proliferation control measures, b) giving a binding assurance that nuclear free European countries will remain so, c) encouraging NATO countries that host nuclear weapons to end such deployment, and d) providing a positive example to other regions such as the Middle East and North East Asia. The Middle East in particular should be encouraged to take steps towards a NWFZ in order to prevent proliferation by countries like Iran or even the possible use of nuclear weapons by Israel. European countries could play a positive role if they 'walked the talk' and established their own NWFZ.

New prospects for success

A number of developments in Europe and internationally are making the prospect of a European NWFZ more achievable.

Political developments since the end of the Cold War have resulted in a corridor of countries that no longer have, or never had, nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. This now makes possible a NWFZ of contiguous countries without any of these countries having to change current practice.

In addition, there is now a possibility of certain NATO states joining such a NWFZ either now or in the future. It used to be widely believed that countries in military relationship with nuclear countries could not join NWFZs, thus ruling out NATO countries.

However, this belief has been dispelled by the examples of a) Australia, a close military ally of the United States, joining the South Pacific Zone, and b) the recent establishment of a Central Asian NWFZ involving countries amongst which there are close military relationships with Russia (under the Tashkent Treaty) and with the United States (e.g. as part of the "War on terror").

NATO countries in which US tactical nuclear weapons are deployed (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey) would not be able to join a NWFZ until the nuclear weapons are removed, as they have been done from Greece. However, other NATO countries could join a NWFZ either by confirming that they would not permit nuclear weapons deployed on their territories in any circumstances (the preferable option) or by requesting an opt-out clause which could be exercised in time of war.

The undertaking given by NATO not to deploy nuclear weapons in the territories of new NATO countries renders mute the concern of these States that joining a NWFZ would be inconsistent with NATO obligations, thus enabling those countries to now join a European NWFZ.



What a NWFZ would entail

There are nine existing regional NWFZs established by treaty. The provisions of each zone vary. However, each treaty prohibits the manufacture, production, possession, testing and acquisition of nuclear weapons by States or the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. In this way the NWFZ obligations go beyond those in the Non-Proliferation Treaty which do not prohibit deployment or stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of nonnuclear weapon States.

Each of the regional NWFZ treaties also includes protocols to be signed by NWS to respect the zone and to commit not to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the zone.

Growing support for a European NWFZ

The proposal for a European NWFZ is receiving increasing support from a range of sources including governments, academics, NGOs and parliaments:

- At the 60th United Nations General Assembly the government of Belarus renewed its proposal for a European NWFZ.
- The Belgian Senate adopted a resolution in 2005, without opposition, calling for a NWFZ in Europe.
- The 40th anniversary of the Latin American and Caribbean NWFZ in 2006 hosted by the government of Mexico highlighted the possibility of a European NWFZ.
- A group of academics and scientists has recently drafted a Model European NWFZ Treaty.

Opposition to NWFZs

None of the above however has muted the opposition of the United States, France and Russia to the establishment of NWFZs in strategic regions in which they currently deploy or wish to retain the option to deploy nuclear weapons. Despite agreeing in principle to the establishment of NWFZs, these three countries took ten years to sign the protocols recognizing the South Pacific Zone, they still have not signed the protocols to the South East Asian NWFZ, and they opposed the establishment of the Central Asian NWFZ.

NWS do not generally support NWFZs because such zones strengthen a global norm against nuclear weapons and gradually curtail the regions in which the NWS can deploy their nuclear weapons. They will thus likely oppose a European NWFZ.

The role of parliamentarians

Parliamentary action has been important in helping establish the current zones, and will be vital to the establishment of a European zone. Parliamentarians can help their governments stand up to the counter pressure from the NWS. Parliamentarians can also promote the idea of a zone to their colleagues in other European parliaments in order to build support. This can happen through parliamentary resolutions, delegations to the Foreign Minister, media work etc...

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He was formerly Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy and the UN Coordinator for the World Court Project, which led the effort to achieve a ruling from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

He was one of the coordinators for the drafting of a model treaty on the abolition of nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons Convention), which has been circulated by the United Nations.

The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) is a global network of over 400 parliamentarians from 70 countries working to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve nuclear disarmament.

PNND provides parliamentarians, and those working with parliamentarians, with:

- Information on nuclear disarmament issues and on international events including United Nations disarmament meetings
- Samples of parliamentary resolutions, motions, questions and legislation from around the world
- Contacts with parliamentary colleagues in other countries with whom to share information and ideas
- A forum for developing joint strategies between parliaments
- Links with disarmament experts



ATTACKING AS VICTIM?! WHAT COULD BE THE BASIS FOR RESPECTFUL DIALOGUE?

Ronnee JAEGER, Bat Shalom, the Jerusalem Women's Action Center, Jerusalem, Israel

(Summary by Marianne Baitsch)

It is a gift to be here, in Monte Verità, which has a history of refuge for those facing persecution in WW II. It seems a fitting place for a conference concerned with human destiny.

In looking at Israel, the victim as attacker, my first thought was, this is clever, clever and tragic. In order to contextualise this statement, I wish to sketch a brief picture of Israel today.

What we have here is a post second Lebanon War scenario. This war was not only immoral, but also a failure, since no objectives were accomplished. Israeli society now faces the economic and social costs of this war – and it presents a crisis. History teaches, that such a crisis, coupled with military defeat, can lead to the rise and strengthening of fascist groups. A racist and supernationalist party, headed by Lieberman has been indeed invited into the cabinet of the Israeli Knesset. The scandals, which rocket the country as the president, the justice minister and perhaps yet the Prime Minister were criminally charged, have also affected the Israeli society, leaving it passive and cynical.

1. There is no trust in the leadership. It is seen as corrupt and having no solution to internal or external problems.
2. The socio-economic pressures leave people with less energy and time for political participation, especially women; who carry the greatest family burden.
3. The violence in the Gaza makes women fearful of venturing to meetings with Palestinian partners in Europe, Jerusalem or in the Occupied West Bank.
4. Meanwhile the separation wall and checkpoints makes it almost impossible for Palestinians to join their Jewish and Palestinian allies.
5. The war and its concomitant language of violence has engendered discussions between “Patriots” and “traitors”, increasing the danger to those of us calling for dialogue and a negotiation settlement to the conflict, and an end to the occupation.

The Result has been a “stuck in the rut” policy of harsh unilateralism, and punishment of the Palestinian population for electing Hamas.

With the help of American military adventurism in Iraq, Israel has been granted victim status, and the Arab world relegated to terrorists. While I would argue that many citizens in Israel have indeed been victims of the world's indifference, there is more than one response to victimhood. While in every group of victims the women and children have suffered the most – women have also emerged as the holders of humanistic values. Values such as caring for others, mediating differences, negotiating agreement and recognizing mutual human rights for mutual societal safety and community building.

We see Jerusalem as a microcosm of the Occupation – with house demolitions and illegal Jewish settlement in the Old City and occupied Eastern Jerusalem. The same checkpoints and harassment deny entry and movement in Jerusalem and endanger Palestinian lives. We work together with Palestinian women in the Occupied Territories and in Eastern Jerusalem. Within Israel we are part of broad coalitions of all the progressive peace Camp.

The common language fostered by Israeli militarism uses language as weapons. Therefore, Palestinians are the enemy, “terrorists” “untrustworthy” the continual “no partners”. Israel demands of the concessions, offers, but gives no concessions and offers nothing.

Our language doesn't use success and failure but speaks of continuing and difficult work together. Besides the physical independents of walls and checkpoints, there is the ongoing difficulty of working together with our Palestinian partners within the power imbalance created by the occupation. An example is the joint International Women's Day demonstration and celebration at Kalarelia checkpoint on March 8th of the year. It included Israeli citizens Jewish and Arab, Palestinians from Israel and from the Occupied territories. Women carried signs in Arabic, English and with a meeting of 300 women, who often cannot meet, feelings ran high.

By working together with our Palestinian partners, we have learned to respect others rights and our own. We have learned to translate ideas into actions, and we continue learning how to work in participatory democracy. We have



learned, sometimes with difficulty, that the only protection for one's own rights is the mutual protection of both. This requires painstaking work. Trust must be built and maintained. New challenges continually arise, and goals change. But friendships develop and our small world is a safe laboratory of social change.

With this immediacy of our state of affairs, you can see that the terrible danger of nuclear weapons, falls off the agenda. This does not mean the dangers have fallen off the agenda.

Israel claims to need nuclear arms to avert the next holocaust, from the surrounding Arab states. Yet Israel, the strongest military in the region, is most often the attacker.

France gave Israel nuclear capability in return for Israel's help in occupying Algeria. In 1960, the Prime Minister David Ben Gurion announced to the Knesset that Israel was building only nuclear potential capability. Only for peaceful use Israel promised that it would not be the first to nuclearize the Middle East. It proclaimed "nuclear ambiguity".

Israel's special status was maintained by American and European guilt. Through the Johnson and Nixon administration, the United States developed a tolerant acceptance of Israel's nuclear build up.

Mordechai Vanunu exposed Israel's nuclear bomb arsenal to the international press, breaking the secret and paying a high personal price.

The Middle East has since become the grounds for armament from East to West.

There is a small active group called the Israeli Committee for a Middle East Free of Atomic and Biological Weapons. Gidon Spiro, a tireless anti-nuclear activist, complains that Israel is seen as responsible, while other Middle East states are seen as posing grave threats. He insists that the most reliable nations are those without nuclear aims.

He points out the dangers to Israel itself from its nuclear productivity

- The poor health profile of workers in the Dimona plant, many of whom have been diagnosed with cancer, and are planning a Class action against the state.
- The ecological dangers are predictable. Contamination of the limited water supply and from there to agricultural produce and so on. Germany's recent sale to Israel of nuclear capacity submarines helps Israel to destroy itself!

Dov Chenin, a new member of the Knesset, is an ecologist who has spoken out against the nuclear threat. As a member of a small three seat party, he must also work to build alliances.

To date there is no public discussion of the issue in Israel. All is secret under a blanket of security.

Israel needs pressure from international groups such as yours, in order to begin to debate the nuclear issue in the civil society.

By aiding and abetting Israel's military build-up and nuclear arsenal, Israel is being harmed by its friends. In learning different lessons victimhood – lessons of community building based on negotiation using international norms and rights, an anti-nuclear platform would be a logical next step – but this does not appear. In fact, appears impossible without opposing concerted international pressure on Israel.



Ronnee Jaeger

Social justice activist most of my adult life, in Canada and in Israel.

Co-founder of MACHSOMWATCH, Israeli women at the check-points, observing, documenting and passing this information to the UN as well as to the Israeli and foreign press.

Activist and political committee member in Bat Shalom.

Profession, social worker.

Bat Shalom

An Israeli national feminist organization. Through the Jerusalem Link we are partnered with the Israeli Palestinian organization - The Jerusalem Women's Centre. Together and separately, we work toward ending the occupation of Palestine and toward a just peace which includes two states for two peoples.

We work at the grass roots level with an emphasis on an equal voice for Israelis and Palestinians in Israel and in the Occupied Territories, drawing on international human rights and a shared vision of peace in the middle-east



DEPLETED URANIUM IN WARFARE

Dr. Gert G. HARIGEL, Senior Physicist emeritus. CERN, Geneva, Switzerland

(Summary by Dr. Marcela Fejgl)

Depleted Uranium has been used in warfare since 1991.

DU ammunition has been used in the Golf War (~1million rounds, spreading ~320 tons uranium). In the Kosovo War ~31000 rounds were spent, discharging ~10 tons and in Bosnia ~11000 rounds with ~3 tons. In Afghanistan up to 100 tons were discharged.

Its military use is based on Uranium's high specific weight which provides it with a high velocity and allows an easy penetration of steel-armored vehicles, followed by spontaneous ignition, burning the target and vaporization of uranium.

After impact DU is broken up into extremely small particles of variable solubility.

The adverse health effects can be attributed to its chemical toxicity, as a heavy metal, heavier than lead. Its radioactive toxicity needs to be further studied.

There are reports of increased cancer incidence in the affected areas.

Aerolized Uranium becomes lodged in the lungs as fine particles measuring 5-10 micrometers. Larger particles can secondarily end up in the digestive tract.

Insoluble particles circulate in the blood and become lodged in the kidneys, lymph nodes, bones, etc. "Uranium lodged in organs is known to chemically interact with biologically or biochemically important molecules in cells and organs such as DNA, proteins, enzymes, phospholipids. Toxicological effects are more likely to be associated with the soluble forms of DU, while radiation effects are mainly to be associated with insoluble forms, such as particles deposited in the lung and local lymph nodes and retained for extended periods of time". (Valery S. Petrosyan) An increase in cancer incidence has been reported from areas where the weapons have been used.

There are no regulations of the use of Depleted Uranium in the weapons.

It is not included in the chemical weapons treaty. Its military interest as an easy penetrating weapon is combined with its profuse availability makes it popular with the military. The uranium penetrators do not contain any additional explosives. There is no legal obligation by any treaty that requires clean-up of the battlefield after the end of the war.

DU consists of two isotopes U238 (99,7%) and U235(0,3%).

The extraction of energy from uranium for peaceful or military purposes asks for well defined ratios of the isotopes. To sustain the chain reaction of nuclear fission, uranium has to be enriched by the fissible isotope U235, (reactor grade of 3,2%-3,6% or weapon grade of + 90% uranium). This enrichment process also produces a waste stream depleted in U235, typically to less than 0,3%, which is often called the tail. Depleted uranium is a low cost material produced during the separation of weapon grade uranium. DU is stored in the USA in large quantities in form of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) in ~54000 cylindric tanks, each containing 12,6 tons. UF₆ is crystalline, but becomes a gaz at 56,4C. There is a danger of rupturing of the containers in case of fire.

The application of a double standard for depositories and DU ammunition is unacceptable. On one hand DU is considered as low-level radioactive material, on the other hand it represents no danger for the enemy's population. The production and use of DU weapons should be prohibited.



Gert Günter Harigel

1995 European Organization for Nuclear Research, CERN, Honorary member of staff

1966 – 1995 CERN, Senior Physicist permanent staff

Extracurriculum (science-related)

- Founding and Council Member of INES (1991-)
Member of Executive Committee since 2005
(International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility)
- NGO - representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva
(Non-Governmental Organization: GIPRI, INES, NAPF)
- Member of the Board of GIPRI (Secretary & Treasurer), (1990-)
(Geneva International Peace Research Institute)
- Member of the "Association Suisse de Pugwash" (1990-), President since 2005
- Member of USPID (1997-) (Unione Scienziati Per Il Desarmo)



Annexe I

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

*Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968,
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969,
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5,
1970 Proclaimed by U.S. President March 5, 1970,
Entered into force March 5, 1970*

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;



not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.



Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Note: On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3). [back to the text]



Annexe II

SUMMARY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. It comprises a preamble, 17 articles, two annexes and a Protocol with two annexes.

The preamble outlines the significance of the Treaty.

Article

- I** stipulates the basic obligations of the Treaty, and prohibits State parties from carrying out any nuclear explosion.
- II** provides for the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna to ensure the Treaty's implementation as well as providing a forum for consultation and cooperation.
- III** focuses on national implementation measures.
- IV** elaborates on the global verification regime to monitor compliance with Treaty provisions. The regime is to comprise a global network of monitoring stations (the International Monitoring System), an International Data Centre in Vienna, a consultation and clarification process, On-site Inspections, and confidence-building measures.
- V** outlines measures to redress a situation which contravenes CTBT provisions and to ensure compliance with the Treaty.
- VI** deals with the settlement of disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of the Treaty.
- VII** is concerned with amendments to the Treaty.
- VIII** stipulates when a review of the Treaty will take place after its entry into force.
- IX** states that the Treaty is of unlimited duration.
- X** deals with the status of the Protocol and the annexes.
- XI** is concerned with signature of the Treaty.
- XII** deals with ratification of the Treaty.
- XIII** is about accession to the Treaty.
- XIV** is about the Treaty's entry into force. This will take place 180 days after the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have all ratified.
- XV** specifies that the Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
- XVI** refers to the Depositary of the Treaty.
- XVII** deals with the authenticity of Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish Treaty texts.

Annex

- 1** to the Treaty lists States by geographical regions for the purposes of elections to the Executive Council.
- 2** to the Treaty lists the 44 States that must ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force.

Protocol Part

- I** describes the functions of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International Data Centre (IDC).
- II** sets up the procedures for on-site inspections.
- III** deals with confidence-building measures.

Annex 1 to the Protocol lists the facilities comprising the IMS network.

Annex 2 to the Protocol lists the characterization parameters for IDC standard event screening.

fulltext: <http://www.ctbto.org/>



Annexe III

FROM MTE. VERITA TO VIENNA - REPORT FROM THE RECENT PREP COM FOR THE (NUCLEAR) NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY -

In April the First Prep Com for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty took place in Vienna. The outcome of that and two further preparatory conferences to take place in the next years are of utmost relevance for a future world without nuclear weapons. As there is a time coincidence with our recent Mte. Verita meeting, we decided to include A) the summarizing press-release of ICAN, the recently formed "International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons" as well as B) the most important points from the chairmans summary.

A) Pressrelease of ICAN on the outcome of the Vienna Prep NPT Conference Contact:

"Nuclear weapons have provided us with the capacity of self-destruction. These weapons are suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal," commented Felicity Hill, coordinator of ICAN and former peace and security adviser for the United Nations. "We know — and have stressed time and again — that we can't cure nuclear war. But we certainly can prevent it."

"This NPT meeting got off to a shaky start because of procedural wrangling. But there has been a great deal of positive dialogue over the last few days, and no one should consider the meeting a failure," she said. "However, while disarmament is back on the table, so are new hydrogen bombs in the US and nuclear submarines in the UK. There has been too little discussion on the proposed US-India deal, although it has been challenged.

"One very positive development is that Costa Rica and Malaysia presented a working paper to encourage governments to begin negotiations for the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) — a law that would comprehensively ban nuclear weapons. "A model NWC, prepared by a consortium of doctors, lawyers and disarmament experts, was submitted to the meeting as an official document. We have our fingers crossed that the idea will take flight, either in this forum or at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva," she continued.

"Such a convention is, in our view, the surest way to bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to verify that elimination has occurred. The NPT itself envisages the goal of an NWC in Article VI. "Governments have always been reluctant to act on such monumental issues as nuclear abolition without an irresistible groundswell of popular support. We must all realise our potential to effect positive change in this area.

"A powerful civil society movement aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons — once and for all — is our greatest hope for global survival. Indeed it may well be our only hope," remarked Hill. "Now is the time to act. Holding off any longer could prove catastrophic. Complacency on this issue could mean the world ends in an afternoon," Felicity Hill concluded.

B) Chairs Summary of most important paragraphs

1. The NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and essential for nuclear disarmament
2. The NPT rests on three pillars and that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes
3. States parties are committed to effective implementation of the NPT and the decisions from 1995 and 2000
4. Multilateralism provides the only sustainable method of dealing with international security issues
5. It is of grave concern that non-state actors might gain access to WMD and their means of delivery
6. There is a need for support to achieve universality of the NPT
7. Achieving compliance with the NPT is of great importance
8. States parties called for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps from 2000, and there remains a general commitment to implementation of Article VI
9. The total elimination of nuclear weapons (NW) was the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, and indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals
10. Support was voiced for the development of a NW convention
11. States parties attached significance to reducing the deployed status of NW
12. Concern was voiced about plans to replace or modernize NW and their means of delivery
13. Nuclear weapon states (NWS) reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament under Article VI
14. The Moscow Treaty was acknowledged as a positive trend towards nuclear disarmament
15. Increased transparency with regard to NW capabilities as a voluntary confidence-building measure was strongly advocated
18. Strong support was expressed for the CTBT and its early entry into force
19. Concerns was expressed about abrogation of the ABMT and development of missile defence systems
20. States parties stressed the importance of further reductions in non-strategic NW
21. Negotiations for the immediate commencement of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is important



22. Fissile material no longer need for military purposes should be placed under IAEA control
24. Disarmament and non-proliferation education is important
25. Nuclear weapon states (NWS) should provide security assurances to Non-NWS that they would not use nuclear weapons against them
26. A universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances should be pursued as a matter of priority
27. Serious proliferation events strained the NPT regime by eroding confidence in the compliance of all states parties
28. States parties welcome IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards
31. Export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime
32. Support was expressed for the concept of international recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ)
34. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995
35. Great concern was expressed regarding the nuclear capability of Israel
36. A solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to the objective of establishing a Middle East NWFZ
37. Serious concern was expressed over Iran's nuclear programme
38. States parties expressed grave concern over the DPRK's nuclear programme and its announcement of a nuclear test
39. States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right under Article IV of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
43. States parties noted the importance of combating nuclear terrorism
44. States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities
51. States parties emphasised the value of the involvement and contribution of civil society in the process of NPT review

Prof. Andreas Nidecker, 23. Mai 2007



Annexe IV

A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

By **GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN**

Wall Street Journal, Jan 4, 2007, January 4, 2007; Page A15

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage — to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium — potentially to weapons grade — highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest



themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago — the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

- Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
- Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
- Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
- Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
- Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
- Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
- Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.
- Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.



Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.

URL for this article: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html>



TEHERANER MACHTKAMPF MIT HANDSCHELLEN DER EHEMALIGE IRANISCHE BOTSCHAFTER IN DEUTSCHLAND, HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN, IST VERHAFTET WORDEN. WOLLTE ER ZU VIEL DIALOG?

JOCHEN BITTNER, DIE ZEIT, NR. 20, 10. MAI 2007

Wie ein Verräter wirkte Hossein Mousavian nicht gerade, als er vor wenigen Wochen im Gespräch mit der ZEIT seine Wunschvorstellungen für die iranische Außenpolitik darlegte. Vielleicht nur ein wenig versöhnlicher als sein Staatspräsident Mahmud Ahmadineschad. »Iran und die USA können ihre bilateralen Probleme lösen und die alten Feindseligkeiten beilegen«, versicherte der ehemalige Atomunterhändler und Ex-Botschafter in Deutschland mit freundlich-ernster Miene am Rande einer Konferenz in der Schweiz. »Zusammen könnten sie eine strategische Rolle für Stabilität in der Region spielen.«

Einen Tag später, am Rednerpult der Versammlung, wurde Mousavian noch konkreter. Nach dem Sturz Saddam Husseins im Irak und der Taliban in Afghanistan, zweier Erzfeinde von Iran, sei die Gelegenheit für eine völlig neue Sicherheitsarchitektur im Mittleren Osten gekommen. »Mut und Weisheit« vorausgesetzt, sagte der 50-Jährige, könnten Iran und die Vereinigten Staaten in einen Dialog eintreten, der überkommene Feindbilder überwinden helfe. »Ein solcher Dialog könnte regionale Sicherheitsarrangements voranbringen und irgendwann zu einer atomwaffenfreien Zone im Nahen Osten führen«, so Mousavians kolossaler Vorschlag.

Möglicherweise war es genau diese Art von Dialogbereitschaft, die Mousavian jetzt ins Gefängnis gebracht hat. Am Montag vergangener Woche verhafteten Beamte der Geheimpolizei den international respektierten Diplomaten in seinem Haus in Teheran. »Wegen einer Serie von Treffen von ausländischen Agenten und des Austausches von Informationen mit ihnen« sei Mousavian festgesetzt worden, berichtete wenig später die reformorientierte iranische Zeitung Aftab-e Yazd unter Hinweis auf eine »vertrauenswürdige Quelle«. Gerüchteweise ist davon die Rede, Mousavian habe Geheimdienstmaterial an den Westen weitergegeben, auch an deutsche Stellen.

In Wahrheit freilich verriet Mousavian alles andere als ein Staatsgeheimnis, indem er die derzeitige Atompolitik seines Präsidenten in aller Vorsicht als unvorsichtig bezeichnete. Nur ist Mousavian eben nicht irgendein Kritiker, sondern einer der profiliertesten Außenpolitiker der gemäßigten iranischen Konservativen.

Bis zum Amtsantritt Ahmadineschads 2005 führte Mousavian unter dem damaligen nationalen Sicherheitsbeauftragten Hassan Rowhani die Nuklearverhandlungen mit dem Westen. Mousavian galt dabei zwar als schlitzohriger Taktiker, doch immerhin führten die Verhandlungen zu einem zeitweiligen Stopp der iranischen Urananreicherung. Bis Ahmadineschad das Verhandlungsteam austauschte und die Uranzentrifugen wieder in Gang setzte. 3000 der Hightechgeräte, sagen iranische Offizielle, sollen seit April in Natanz laufen, fast zehnmal mehr, als westliche Geheimdienste bis dahin vermutet hatten. Mit ihnen lässt sich Brennstoff für friedliche Zwecke gewinnen, aber auch der Rohstoff für Atombomben.

Die neue, aggressive Politik des Präsidenten isolierte Iran und brachte dem Land im Dezember die ersten UN-Sanktionen ein. In einem Interview mit iranischen Journalisten warf Mousavian der Regierung daraufhin vor, die Lage auf die leichte Schulter zu nehmen. Zusammen mit dem ehemaligen Chefunterhändler Hassan Rowhani, hatte Mousavian inzwischen die Leitung des Center for Strategic Research übernommen, eines regierungsnahen Thinktanks. In dieser Funktion gab Mousavian iranischen Journalisten im Januar ein Interview. »Es ist sehr einfach zu sagen, die Sanktionen seien nichts weiter als ein Fetzen Papier«, kommentierte er in dessen Verlauf eine Formulierung Ahmadineschads. Iran solle lieber »flexibel, vorsichtig und geduldig« agieren, riet er. Doch offenbar hat Mousavian die Härte des neuen Regierungsstils unterschätzt. Mit seiner Verhaftung ist er ihr nun selber zum Opfer gefallen.

Offensichtlich entbrennt vor allem an der Frage der Atompolitik in Iran derzeit ein Machtkampf zwischen dem radikal-konservativen und dem pragmatisch-realpolitischen Lager. »Die Radikalen müssten Mousavian nicht festnehmen, wenn sie ihre Position nicht gefährdet sähen«, sagt der frühere Schweizer Botschafter in Teheran, Tim Guldemann, der heute an der Universität Frankfurt lehrt. »Wenn ein Mann von seinem Niveau festgenommen wird, dann ist das ein Hinweis für einen handfesten Streit innerhalb des Regimes über die Nuklearfrage.« Doch auch innen- und wirtschaftspolitisch wächst im iranischen Parlament offenkundig der Widerstand gegen die kompromisslose Politik Ahmadineschads. Zahlreiche Abgeordnete fordern, die für Februar 2008 vorgesehenen Parlamentswahlen um einige Monate zu verschieben und die nächsten Präsidentenwahlen auf einen ähnlichen Termin, möglichst gar auf denselben Tag, vorzulegen.

Mit einem entsprechenden Gesetz würde die Amtszeit Ahmadineschads beträchtlich verkürzt. Der Entwurf, so heißt es aus diplomatischen Kreisen, soll zwar bereits vom streng konservativen Wächterrat abgelehnt und ans Parlament zurückverwiesen worden sein. Die Abgeordneten bereiten derzeit einen neuen Anlauf vor. Steckt hinter dieser Initiative ein schleichendes Impeachment gegen den Holocaust-leugnenden, islamistischen Präsidenten?




Der Iran-Experte der Berliner Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Johannes Reissner, hält das nicht für ausgeschlossen. » Im April trafen sich etwa hundert Abgeordnete mit den beiden früheren Staatspräsidenten und Ahmadineschad-Opponenten Rafsandschani und Chatami sowie dem früheren Parlamentspräsidenten Mehdi Karrubi, dem Gründer der neuen, gemäßigt-pragmatischen Partei National Trust«, berichtet er. » Dies war ein Signal, dass sich das politische Zentrum Irans gegen die Hardliner um Ahmadineschad formiert.« Zu ebendiesem Zentrum ist auch Mousavian zu zählen. » Gewiss soll seine Festnahme auch dazu dienen, im beginnenden Vorwahlkampf ein Exempel zu statuieren und potenzielle Kandidaten der Gegenseite von vornherein einzuschüchtern«, glaubt Reissner.

»**Nicht ein iota**« werde Iran von seinen Rechten zur Nutzung der Kernkraft abrücken, verkündete Mahmud Ahmadineschad vor wenigen Tagen. Im Atomstreit, so der Präsident bei einer Rede in der Stadt Kerman, »fordert die iranische Nation Gerechtigkeit. Unsere Nation sagt: Gesetz für jeden, Recht für jeden!«

Hossein Mousavian wird derweil angeblich im berüchtigten Teheraner Evin-Gefängnis verhört. Dort, wo das Regime schon viele Oppositionelle foltern ließ, wartet er auf seinen Prozess vor dem »Revolutionären Gerichtshof«. Ein bitteres Schicksal für einen Mann, der bei einem seiner letzten öffentlichen Auftritte im März noch davon sprach, der Mittlere Osten habe eine echte Chance, »von altem Groll gereinigt« zu werden. Hossein Mousavian kritisierte Irans Präsidenten Ahmadineschad. Jetzt droht ihm ein Prozess vor dem »Revolutionären Gerichtshof«.

Nuclearisation in Europe and the Middle East –

From threat to
preventive action



Signed by

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Concluding Statement

Avoiding another war in Iran - a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East - Nuclear weapon free zone in Europe - Strengthening the NPT

Upon invitation of the Swiss chapter of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW, Nobel peace prize 1985), an international conference on the topic of "Nuclearisation in Europe and the Middle East" took place on Monte Verità, Ascona, Switzerland from March 22nd to 25th 2007.

In a time of high international tension in the Middle East, participants focused on the absolute necessity for high-level constructive dialogue between all the parties. Respect for mutual fears as well as the overcoming of misunderstandings due to cultural and historical differences should inherently be part of such dialogue. It is feared that threatening arguments on both sides could lead to escalation. A preemptive strike policy and the use of military force however, would have catastrophic consequences for the local population. Moreover, it would have serious political repercussions, promote nuclear proliferation and further destabilise the entire region. The world needs a stable Iran, just as Iran needs cooperation with the rest of the international community.

One feasible way to stabilise the region would be the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), an idea proposed by Iran and Egypt in 1974 and discussed repeatedly and promoted in the United Nations and Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences. It was noted that a single leading country, even a single city could stimulate a NWFZ in the Middle East. In order to guarantee that the nuclear weapons states respect the provisions of the NWFZ, consultations are required. Even if only a symbolic act initially, it could bring about a new situation and break the political deadlock. Obviously, such a zone must eventually cover the entire Middle East.

NATO's nuclear doctrine includes optional first use of nuclear weapons and their stationing in European non-nuclear weapon states. This doctrine was questioned, as it is based on a strategic concept which may be detrimental to European security. It is considered that nuclear weapons on European territory nowadays cannot be justified. In the interest of new thinking on security in Europe and a doctrine change, the voice of Non Nuclear Weapon states (NNWS) of the NATO alliance should be heard more often, and public opposition to nuclear weapons respected. A NWFZ in Europe would be a significant step towards a nuclear weapon free world.

Finally, participants discussed the ever important role of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its verification functions. The danger of a further erosion of the NPT, due to the worrisome absence of progress in nuclear disarmament by non-fulfillment of the nuclear weapon states obligations with article VI, was emphasised. The NNWS should play a stronger role in the implementation and evolution of the NPT, particularly prior to the next review conference in 2010. In this context, discussions between representatives of the NNWS, IPPNW, the Inter-national Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) were proposed.

Ascona, march 24th 2007